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Smart home devices control a home’s environmental and security settings. This includes 
devices that control home thermostats, sprinkler systems, light bulbs, and home 
appliances. Malicious manipulation of the settings of these devices by an outside 
adversary has caused emotional distress and could even cause physical harm. For 
example, researchers have reported that there is a rise in domestic abuse perpetrated via 
smart home devices; victims have reported their thermostat settings being unwittingly 
manipulated and being locked out of their house due to their smart lock code being 
changed. Rapid adoption of smart home devices by consumers has led to an urgent need 
to research mitigation strategies to protect consumers from device takeover. 
 
Currently there is not an easy way for home users to detect that a malicious actor is 
making unwanted changes to their smart home devices. Change requests to smart home 
devices travel across the network in the form of network packets. Most of time the 
payloads of the packets are encrypted using strong encryption methods, so it is not 
possible to simply read the contents of the packet to learn if the packet contains 
instructions for the smart device to change states. Previous research has successfully 
trained machine learning algorithms to identify unique network traffic patterns indicative 
of state change requests sent to smart home devices. This research extends previous 
research by identifying state change requests of smart home devices made by residents 
via a smart home device app on their smart phones or tablets. This research identified 13 
key attributes of 3,178 encrypted network traffic connections. The attributes were used as 
features to train three machine learning algorithms to recognize state change requests. 
Four smart home devices were used chosen from the following categories: 1) devices 
with simple behaviors (turns on and off), 2) devices with complex behaviors (can be 
turned on for a set amount of time), and 3) devices that send a large amount of data (i.e. 
video camera). 
 
The success of identifying state change requests over encrypted traffic from a mobile app, 
combined with previous research that identified state changes sent to the smart home 
device, allows for the development of a system that could block unwanted state changes 
that originate from a malicious user located outside of the house. Therefore, this research 
contributes to the body of knowledge of smart home device security and could be 
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 Domestic abuse hotlines have been receiving calls from women who have 
reported various issues with their smart home devices; one woman reported that she 
turned on her air-conditioner and a moment later it turned off all by itself, another said 
that the codes to her front door smart lock kept changing, and one reported that her smart 
doorbell would periodically ring with no one at the front door (Bowles, 2018). Bowles 
(2018) found that the changes were not occurring because of some bug in the software, 
but by men who were actively harassing their partners. This type of domestic abuse is on 
the rise thanks to the explosive adoption of Internet of Things devices(He et al., 2018). 
The term Internet of Things (IoT) first appeared in 1999 and is attributed to the 
British technologist Ashton (Ashton, 1999). He described it as physical objects that 
connect to the Internet via sensors. The term has grown to include the data that is 
exchanged between devices, stored in the cloud, and analyzed (Weber, 2016). Smart 
home devices are a subset of IoT, referring to IoT devices used in a residence. This paper 
uses the term smart home devices instead of IoT since this research is focused on devices 
found in a home. Examples of smart home devices include: smart light bulbs that can turn 




milk, smart doorbells that call our smart phone and allows us to talk to the person at the 
front door, to the more bizarre example of a soil sensors for house plants that tweets 
“water me please” when they are too dry (Hammill & Hendricks, 2013). 
 Two of the top vulnerabilities of smart home devices, weak password policies and 
a lack of account lockout by the device’s Cloud server, make account takeover trivial for 
attackers (Alharbi & Aspinall, 2018). Once an attacker has commandeered a smart 
device, the type of damage inflicted is only limited by the attacker’s imagination and the 
functionality of the smart home device. Theoretical attacks include: locking a resident’s 
television until a ransom has been paid, targeting specific individuals for harassment, and 
even scaring someone out of their house so that the attacker can gain access for robbery 
or other purposes (Freed et al., 2018a; Ronen & Shamir, 2016a).   
Problem Statement 
One of the most risk-inducing features of smart home devices is that they can be 
accessed from anywhere in the world (Ali et al., 2017; Jia et al., 2017; Ronen & Shamir, 
2016a). As a result, a malicious user can manipulate the devices with known user 
credentials (Freed et al., 2018a). More advanced attacks, such as a malicious actor 
gaining control of a Cloud server, is also possible (Alharbi & Aspinall, 2018). 
Smart home devices, such as WiFi connected light bulbs and thermostats, are 
becoming more prevalent in residential homes (He et al., 2018). Currently there is not an 
easy way for home users to detect that a malicious actor is making unwanted changes to 
their smart home devices (Geeng & Roesner, 2019a; Matthews et al., 2017; Zeng et al., 
2017). Change requests to smart home devices travel across the network in the form of 




encryption methods, so it is not possible to simply read the contents of the packet to learn 
if the packet contains instructions for the smart device to change states (Apthorpe, 
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Copos et al., 2016a). Despite the payload being 
encrypted, there are attributes of the packet that are not, such as the source Internet 
Protocol (IP) and Media Access Control (MAC) address, the destination address, any 
Domain Name System (DNS) queries, the protocol, and several other revealing pieces of 
the packet are unencrypted (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b; Vijay Sivaraman et 
al., 2015). These attributes, along with the size of the payload can be used to establish 
patterns indicative of a smart device state change request, versus an update, versus a 
status check (Meidan et al., 2017). 
Researchers have successfully identified smart home devices and the state 
changes applied to the devices by implementing machine learning algorithms to 
categorize encrypted network traffic  (Acar et al., 2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, 
et al., 2017; Copos et al., 2016b; Marchal et al., 2019; Meidan et al., 2017; Miettinen et 
al., 2017a). Copos et al. (2016) and Acar et al. (2018) identified unique network traffic 
patterns indicative of state change requests with the assistance of two supervised learning 
algorithms, Random Forest (RF) and k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN). It was observed that 
when the Nest Thermostat transitions from Home to Away packets are sent from the Nest 
to a specific Nest Cloud server with payload sizes of 1375, 1391, and 2911 (Copos et al., 
2016b).  
Other researchers found that the Wemo Insight Switch receives large spikes of 
data when switched from off to on and vice versa (Acar et al., 2018).  Several researchers 




was connected to the network, through network traffic patterns (Marchal et al., 2019; 
Meidan et al., 2017; Miettinen et al., 2017a). Other researchers studied the flow of traffic, 
which they defined as the sequence of packets sent by a device over a particular protocol, 
such as Network Time Protocol (NTP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and others (Marchal et al., 2019). The researchers 
converted the flow into a binary time series which was segmented into one second 
intervals with each segment containing a one if there was at least one packet during that 
time and zero if there was not. They discovered that each device’s flow of network traffic 
produced a distinct pattern. This research built upon the aforementioned research to 
identify state change requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home 
devices. 
Dissertation Goal 
This research extended previous research by identifying the best performing 
features and machine learning algorithm combination capable of identifying state change 
requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home devices. It was 
important to focus on popular smart home devices so that the outcome of this research 
was be applicable to the widest audience possible. The different types included smart 
home devices that have simple behavior (i.e. turn a switch on and off), complex behavior 
(i.e. turn water on for five minutes), and send large amounts of data (i.e. video cameras). 
Similar methods, implemented by previous researchers, leveraging machine learning 
algorithms were used to categorize encrypted network traffic patterns originating from 
the user’s WiFi connected smart phone or tablet, indicative of state change requests of 




Identifying state change requests across a variety of different types of smart home 
devices, must be done at the home network level, which is the common connection point 
for most smart home device communication (Zeichick, 2018). To accomplish this, home 
network traffic flow was sequenced into packet size over time intervals (Acar et al., 
2018). To link user action to traffic patterns several features of the traffic flow was 
studied to identify patterns. Interesting features to study included the average packet size 
per sequence, standard deviation of packet sizes, average time series, protocols used in 
communication, and many other identifiable packet attributes.  
To accurately train a machine learning algorithm it is important to identify the 
most meaningful features. Testing features for worthiness was accomplished by 
implementing a 4-fold cross validation was performed, which involved randomly 
splitting the training set into five distinct subsets, training and evaluating the model 4 
times, picking a different fold for evaluation each time, and then training on the other 4 
folds. The potential set of features to be studied can be represented as follows. 
𝐸"	 = {𝐹, 𝐷, 𝐿} 
E, represents the extracted features and T represents the time interval. F are the features 
of the traffic sent to the smart home device to initiate a state change, which were 
mentioned earlier in the paper (e.g. the source IP and MAC address, the destination 
address, any DNS queries, and the protocol). D is the set of smartphones and tablets, and 
L is used to denote location of where a change request originated. L is a binary value 
representing whether the smartphone or tablet is connected to the home network, which 
means that it is home, or not connected to the home network, which identifies it as not 




 In the above definition, 𝐹 = {𝑓!	, 𝑓$, … , 𝑓&}	in which 𝑓'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a 
feature. The set F was e based on those commonly adopted by literature. One goal of this 
research was to identify a subset of F that can be used to identify state changes 
effectively and efficiently.  
Based on the success of previous research in identifying state changes sent to the 
smart home device, this research tested the effectiveness of both the Random Forest 
classifier and KNN classifier to identify patterns of network originating from a smart 
phone and tablet. Additionally, the effectiveness of Naïve Bayes algorithms was also 
assessed. 
The ability to detect a state change across multiple types of smart home devices is 
the missing piece to identify if a malicious actor is actively manipulating a resident’s 
smart home device or devices. It was the intention that this research will assist in 
identifying where the state change request originated from; did the user request the 
change from inside their house, using their home WiFi connected smart phone or tablet, 
or did the change request originate from outside the home, from an individual 
communicating directly to the smart device’s Cloud site? The key to differentiating 
between internal and external state change requests is to correlate the outbound request 
made by the user on their home WiFi connected smart phone/tablet to the inbound state 
change request from the smart device’s Cloud site. If an outbound request exists and then 
a corresponding inbound request exists, then the change was made from inside the house. 
If there is only the inbound request, then the change request originated from outside of 
the house. This will address situations when a malicious actor has surreptitiously gained 




over the resident’s smart home device.  The specific scenario that was studied is when the 
user is at home and changes are being initiated on the Cloud site from outside the user’s 
home by a malicious actor. 
Other scenarios are also applicable. This research could help identify when a 
botnet has taken control of a smart home device and is actively controlling it. 
Additionally, it could identify when a manufacturer’s Cloud server has been 
compromised and the attackers are actively controlling the smart home device. 
Ideally, the smart device manufacturer would provide a solution to prevent rogue 
changes to smart home devices. One solution would be for manufacturers to alert users 
when they notice logins from unknown devices or devices located in previously unseen 
locations. Unfortunately, this feature does not appear to be provided by any manufacturer 
(He et al., 2018). Another approach to prevent unwanted changes from outside the home 
would be to prevent smart home devices from connecting to the Internet. This is not 
viable since researchers have determined that blocking smart home devices from 
connecting to the Internet causes many of the devices to stop working (Apthorpe, 
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017) 
 In summary, to identify change requests to smart home devices by smartphones or 
tablets, identifying features of network traffic were extracted and used to train several 
machine learning algorithms. The features extracted were tested to ensure that they did 
not mislead the machine learning algorithm. Next, several machine learning algorithms 





The research questions focused on each aspect of the project, from choosing the 
correct smart home devices to include in the study, to identify smart home device 
changes that have been sent over an encrypted connection. 
• What popular smart home devices receive their instructions from their Cloud 
server? 
• What popular smart home devices connect to a home WiFi network? 
• What popular smart home devices send unencrypted network traffic? 
• What popular smart home devices send encrypted network traffic?   
• Will publicly available network traffic captures of smart home devices be useful? 
o Will they contain traffic of change requests sent from a smart phone/tablet 
to a smart home device? 
§ Will the traffic be identifiable since it is encrypted? 
• Is it possible to learn the general goal of encrypted traffic sent by smart phone 
apps, by correlating the traffic to events on the smart home device? 
o Is it possible to differentiate commands from background traffic? 
§ Updates to the device, time updates, other communication of this 
type? 
• Which type of feature will be most useful in training a machine learning 
algorithm to recognize state change requests in encrypted payloads? 
o statistical features 
o aggregated features 
o synthesized 




• Which machine learning algorithm will perform the most efficiently to identify 




o Naïve Bayes 
Relevance and Significance 
Initial research into the typical network architecture of smart home devices 
revealed some unique characteristics that may be used to alert a user that a malicious 
actor has made an unwanted change to their smart home device. The main concept is that 
most smart home devices are directly controlled by a manufacturer’s Cloud server 
(Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a). When a user is at home and makes a change on 
their smartphone via the smart device’s app, the change request traverses their home 
WiFi network, is sent to the smart device’s Cloud server, the change is noted on the 
Cloud server, sent to the home WiFi network, then, finally, applied to the smart home 
device (see Figure 1). This means that at the home network level, when a user is at home, 
changes originate from inside the home, travel outside the home, then back in again.  
This is in contrast to when someone outside the home makes a change; the change 
is applied to the Cloud server, sent down to the home WiFi network, and applied to the 
smart device (see Figure 2). What is missing in this scenario, is the change request 
originating from inside the home. This missing piece can be used to establish if the 
change originated from inside the home or from outside the home. This can be used if the 






Figure 1. Change initiated by a home user (notice both the change request by the smart 
phone and the change pulled from the Cloud server traverse the home wireless router) 
 
 
Figure 2. Change initiated by a rogue actor (notice that the change request made by the 
rogue actor does not traverse the home wireless 
 
The purpose of this research was to identify “rogue changes”, which is defined 
here as changes made to a smart home device by an actor who is outside the home 
network. This addresses the situation of when a user is at home and wants to be alerted 
when unwanted changes are being made by an individual outside the home. 
Unfortunately, this situation is becoming more common in domestic abuse situations 




smart home device, so they are the ones that also control the device. Naughton (2018) 
found men are using smart home devices to harass their partners. There are times when a 
home user will want to make changes to their smart home devices when they are away 
from their home, and, therefore, not on their home network. This research did not intend 
to create the full software solution to identify rogue changes. Instead, this research 
intended to fill a gap that would allow for the creation of such software. Previous 
research has been successful at using machine learning to identify state changes in 
network traffic for specific smart home devices, however, there doesn’t appear to be 
research that has identified a solution across disparate device types. This research enables 
the identification of state change requests across several different device types. This 
provides the missing link to create a tool that is able to identify if a state change request 
originated from in the house or outside the house. 
Another common scenario this addresses is compromised Cloud accounts. It has 
been shown that two of the top vulnerabilities of smart home devices are weak password 
policies and no account lockout by the smart device’s Cloud server interface (Alharbi & 
Aspinall, 2018). This vulnerability introduces the risk of attacks being carried out against 
a compromised account. A Milwaukee couple’s smart home devices were accessed by an 
attacker due to a compromised username and password (Sears, 2019). The attacker turned 
their thermostat up to 90 degrees, then started talking to them via their Nest Security 
camera, and finally started playing vulgar music over the security camera.  
This research did not intend to address all aspects of smart home device security. 
Like computer security, it is a broad field covering topics such as data extraction, device 




2017; Sikder et al., 2018). This research, which was focused on unwanted changes to 
smart device settings originating from outside of the house, is an area that does not 
appear to be covered. 
One of the biggest challenges of this research was that most network traffic 
between a smart phone to the Cloud server and from the Cloud server to the smart device 
is encrypted (Copos et al., 2016b). Therefore, it was difficult to match the network traffic 
to the change being made. The action must be learned by correlating the action to type of 
network traffic. This is a black box problem (the actual work done to solve the problem is 
not known) which will rely on pattern recognition to solve. Acar et al. (2018) found a 
small discrepancy in traffic size when the Wemo Insight Switch was turned from on to 
off and from off to on. Other researchers analyzing network traffic have been able to 
positively identify the motion sensor of a Nest device being tripped and the wake word 
being spoken for Amazon’s Echo (Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017).  
Barriers and Issues 
 One of the main challenges for this research was to learn the purpose of encrypted 
network traffic based upon patterns identified through training a machine learning 
algorithm. Previous research has demonstrated that it is possible to determine, through 
network traffic patterns, when a smart light switch is turned on and off (Apthorpe, 
Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b).  The same methodology implemented by Apthorpe et al. 
(2017b) was followed during this research. 
 Both datasets, one provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) and the other by Ren et al. 
(2019), are raw network traffic captures. Neither of the research groups provided labeling 




encrypted payloads and then labeling the datasets. As mentioned, since the payloads are 
encrypted it was impossible to see if they contain state change requests. Therefore, state 
change requests were generated with the same smart home device in our lab environment 
and then were compared with the traffic from the publicly available network traffic. 
When the encrypted traffic that matched (e.g. payload size, response time, protocol, etc.) 
then the publicly available network traffic packet was labeled as a state change. 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
 The main goal was to identify state change requests sent over a network from an 
app on a smart phone to the smart home device’s Cloud site. Therefore, this research only 
focused on traffic sent from a smart phone or tablet to a smart device’s Cloud site. 
Identifying these state changes filled the missing piece to create an application that could 
identify smart home device state change requests that originate from outside of the home. 
However, creating this application was outside the scope of this research.  
This research includes smart home devices that have been designed to have 
change requests first flow through the device’s Cloud site then to the smart home device. 
It is assumed that having change requests first go to the device’s Cloud site and then to 
the device itself is a very common architecture. Therefore, this research is applicable to 
the most common smart home devices in use. 
 This research did not plan to address the other numerous security vulnerabilities 
of smart home devices; current security vulnerabilities include issues such as snooping on 
personal webcams, analyzing web traffic generated by smart home devices to determine 




device via a known vulnerability. These other issues have been well documented and 
there are several research efforts currently underway.  
Definition of Terms 
• Smart home device 
o An electronic device that connects to the Internet, can be controlled 
remotely by the user, and was purchased for use in the home. 
• Malicious actor 
o A group or individual that wishes to cause harm, either physical or 
emotional, to its target group or individual. 
• Cloud service 
o A server controlled and housed by the manufacturer of the smart home 
device 
• Botnet 
o A collection of computers, which can include smart home devices, that 
have been commandeered by an attacker to cause harm to their target.  
The harm typically involves having all of the computers in the botnet 
send network traffic to one site in attempt to overwhelm the target 
preventing it from responding to legitimate traffic. 
• Black box problem 
o A problem is presented and the answer is given without any explanation of 
how the answer was arrived at. The actual work done to solve the problem 
is not known. This is typical of machine learning algorithms that are 




solve the given problem.  The algorithm is fed the question and responds 
with an answer void of explanation of how the answer was reached. 




o Artificial Neural Network 
• ARP 
o Address Resolution Protocol 
• CARA 
o Clairvoyant access right assignment 
• CSV 
o Comma separated value 
• DDOS 
o Distributed denial of service 
• DOS 
o Denial of service 
• DNS  
o Domain Name Service 
• ESO 
o environmental situation oracles 
• GPS 





o Inter-arrival time 
• IDM 
o Intrusion Detection Mitigation 
• IDS 
o Intrusion Detection System 
• IoT 
o Internet of Things 
• IP 
o Internet Protocol 
• ISP 
o Internet Service Provider 
• KNN 
o k-Nearest Neighbors 
• LED 
o Light-emitting diode 
• MAC (address) 
o Media access control (address) 
• NIDS 
o Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
• NTP 





o Random Forest 
• SDN 
o software defined networking 
• SVM 
o Support Vector Machine 
• SSL 




o Transmission Control Protocol 
• TPR 
o true positive rate 
• WiFi 
o Wireless networking technology 
Summary 
 This research extended previous research by identifying the best performing 
features and machine learning algorithm combination capable of identifying state change 
requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home devices. This was 
accomplished by training a machine learning algorithm with home network traffic in 
order for it to learn the network pattern analogous of smart home device change requests 
from smart phones and tablets. Several categories of smart home devices were included 









Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction to Smart Home Device Security 
Companies are rushing to meet consumers’ growing need for smart home devices. 
This rush to market by manufacturers has produced serious deficiencies in privacy and 
security. This same mistake was made 20 years ago when consumers rushed to the 
Internet to shop and bank online (Shackelford et al., 2017). The Internet was designed to 
openly share data, which is the complete opposite of what is necessary for secure 
transactions.  Malicious actors took advantage of the lack of security by creating malware 
and sniffing unencrypted data with the goal of stealing personal data (Shackelford et al., 
2017). The industry responded by adding security layers and products.  Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) was implemented to secure internet transactions, antivirus programs to rid 
computers of nasty malware, and passwords to authenticate users.  This solution is not 
foolproof since it relies on consumers to implement many of the solutions. Unfortunately, 
most home users are not technical; they do not understand how to properly configure 
their systems or realize the importance of a strong password (Fu et al., 2017b). The same 
is true with smart home devices. Most home users can’t perform basic security functions 





Current Research of Smart Home Device Security 
Research has uncovered major vulnerabilities in smart home devices. Alrawi et al. 
(2019) evaluated the security of 45 smart home devices by studying the security of the 
smart devices’ services, its mobile applications, its Cloud endpoints, and its 
communications. They found that several of the devices’ services had self-signed 
certificates, supported weak ciphers, used short Transmission Layer Security (TLS)/ 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) keys, permitted the use of vulnerable version of SSL, and 
had expired certificates (Alrawi et al., 2019a). For the mobile apps the researchers found 
that one or more issues related to permissions, sensitive data, or incorrect use of 
cryptography. They also found 24 over-privileged mobile applications that had 
permissions on the mobile device that were not used. On the smart devices’ network, they 
found 18 devices that used outdated services, leaked sensitive information, lacked 
encryption for authentication, or ran a vulnerable service. They found that: 1) eight 
devices used cloud endpoints that are vulnerable and have public exploits, 2) seven 
devices authenticated with cloud endpoints in clear text, and 3) 26 devices used cloud 
endpoints that have TLS/SSL configuration issues, like self-signed certificates, domain 
name mismatch, and support for vulnerable versions of TLS/SSL protocol. One positive 
finding is that the majority of the devices used encryption when communicating over the 
Internet  
Notra et al. (2014) experimented with several smart home devices, including the 
Phillips Hue light-bulb, the Belkin WeMo power switch, and the Nest smoke-alarm, and 
found that the devices lack encryption, appropriate authentication, and integrity checks. 




denial of service (DOS), replay, man-in-the-middle, device tampering, information 
disclosure, side channel attack, and eavesdropping (Atamli & Martin, 2014; Kasinathan 
et al., 2013).  
A French company, Eurecom, analyzed 123 smart devices and discovered 38 
vulnerabilities that included bad encryption and deliberately set backdoors (Costin et al., 
2014a). Out of the fifty smart home devices that Symantec studied none of them forced 
strong passwords or implemented authentication between the device and the cloud 
(Wueest, 2015). Hewlett Packard had similar findings and characterized the main smart 
home device security issues as: not encrypting network traffic, poor authentication, and 
vulnerable web interfaces (Enterprise, 2015). This problem is so bad that the FBI warned 
home users of smart home devices’ vulnerabilities (FBI, 2015). 
Attacks to smart home devices are external, the Mirai botnet, and internal, 
harassing residents by altering the thermostat (He et al., 2019a). These attacks can be 
categorized into five types of behavior: 1) ignoring the functionality, 2) reducing the 
functionality, 3) extending the functionality, 4) discerning residents’ behavior based on 
smart device generated network activity, and 5) misusing the functionality (Apthorpe, 
Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b; Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). In the first type, the attacker 
ignores the designed feature of the smart home device (if it was a smart camera, they 
don’t use any of the functionality of a camera) and instead treat the device as an 
embedded computer (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). An example of this is installing malware 
on the smart home device to make it part of a botnet. Botnets comprised of smart home 




attacks; an example is the Mirai attack which brought down major services such as 
Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, and GitHub (Kolias et al., 2017)  
The second type of attack is reducing the functionality of the smart home device 
which involves disabling the device or features of the device. Examples include disabling 
a smart television so that it won’t turn on and altering the functionality of a smart 
refrigerator so that it won’t cool its contents (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a).  
The third type of attack, extending the functionality, involves using the 
functionality in a different way than designed in order to achieve an unexpected or 
different physical effect. Ronen et al. (2016) demonstrated an attack in which they took 
control of a smart light bulb and strobed the lights in such a way as to trigger seizures in 
people suffering from photosensitive epilepsy. The same researchers also demonstrated 
how they could manipulate an light-emitting diode’s (LED) light intensity to create a 
covert channel (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). This was accomplished by quickly switching 
light intensities that mimic the sending of binary data. The light intensities used were so 
close in brightness that they could not be discerned by the human eye.  
 The fourth type of attack involves discerning residents’ behavior based upon the 
network traffic generated by smart home devices (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 
2017b). Researchers studied the Sense Sleep Monitor, the Nest Cam Indoor security 
camera, the WeMo switch, and the Amazon Echo and found that the encrypted network 
traffic generated by these devices reveal sensitive information about the users (Apthorpe, 
Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b). For the Sense sleep monitor the network traffic peaked 
when the user interacted with it; in the smart home laboratory the researchers were able 




9:15am. These times correlated to spikes in network traffic generated by the Sense sleep 
monitor revealing the user’s sleep pattern. The same correlations were made between 
device usage and traffic spikes for the Nest Cam Indoor security camera, the Wemo 
switch and the Amazon Echo (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017b). Copos et al. 
(2016) was able to identify the network traffic patterns produced when the Nest smoke 
detector detects smoke and when the smoke alarm is triggered.  
The fifth type of attack, misusing the functionality, is the main focus of this 
research project.  This attack uses the functionality of the smart home device, but does so 
in an incorrect or unauthorized way (Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). These attacks are 
typically used to harass the resident. For example, an attacker my turn down the smart 
thermostat in the winter so that house if very cold or turn the lights on in the middle of 
the night to wake victim. 
Domestic Abusers Use of Smart Home Devices 
 Smart home devices are becoming the weapon of choice for perpetrators of 
domestic abuse (Freed et al., 2018a). This is not surprising given their history of using 
technology against their victims. Examples of this abuse includes online harassment, 
cyberbullying, cyberstalking, and doxing (Douglas, 2016; Fraser et al., 2010; Vitak et al., 
2017a; Wisniewski et al., 2016a). Domestic abuse is surprisingly common, with research 
indicating that one in three women and one in six men will experience intimate partner 
violence in their life (Freed et al., 2018a).  
 Examples of smart device domestic abuse include: switching the air-conditioner 
off right after the victim turns it on, changing the code for the smart front door lock, and 




or, more likely in domestic abuse cases, to show power (Bowles, 2018). These attacks are 
accomplished in the very low-tech method of signing into the device’s Cloud account 
with the username and password. In some cases the abuser already knows the username 
and password because they were the one that setup the smart home device (Freed et al., 
2018a).  In other cases, they gain the password either by intimidating the victim to 
disclose it,  guessing the password based upon intimate knowledge of the victim, or by 
answering the password reset security questions (Freed et al., 2018a).  
 Even though domestic abusers’ attack methods are not technically sophisticated 
does not mean that they are easy to prevent. Freed et al (2018) analyzed current threat 
models and countermeasures and determined that they do not adequately address attacks 
in which the attacker possesses intimate knowledge of their victims. To solve this 
problem the researchers suggest focusing on attack methods of average computer users, 
like carrying out an attack with a compromised password. Freed et al. (2018) 
recommended analyzing the difference in legitimate user behavior versus the attacker’s. 
They suggest the Cloud service use the learned difference in behavior during 
authentication to determine if it is the legitimate user logging in or the attacker. 
Smart Home Device Architecture 
 The network architecture of smart home devices is typically configured in one of 
two ways: 1) Cloud-centric, which is mobile application to cloud or 2) direct access, 
which is mobile application to device (Wang et al., 2018). With Cloud-centric, the user 
issues changes via their smart phone which  communicates directly with the smart home 




2014). An example of a smart home device that uses this architecture is the Nest 
thermostat.   
Direct access cuts out the Cloud server as the middle-man. Instead the user 
communicates directly to the smart home device via the app on their smart phone (Notra 
et al., 2014). Examples include the Philips Hue light-bulb and the WeMo switch.  
The Cloud-centric architecture is currently the most popular (Intellectsoft, 2015). 
The focus of this research is primarily on the Cloud-centric architecture since it is 
focused on malicious state changes to smart home devices originating from outside of the 
home. 
Blocking the Smart Home Device from Accessing the Cloud 
 On initial examination of how to block external attackers from making changes to 
smart devices located in the home it may seem like the best approach would be to block 
the smart home device from connecting to its Cloud site. After all, if the smart home 
device cannot connect to its Cloud site it will not get any of the changes requested by an 
external attacker. However, as outlined in the previous section, Cloud-centric is the most 
common configuration for smart home devices. Hence, if Cloud access is blocked, then 
the user who is at home will not be able to make any changes to their smart home device 
because all of their requests go through the smart device’s Cloud site.  
Additionally, completely blocking a smart home device from connecting to its 
Cloud server renders most smart home devices ineffective. Apthorpe et al. (2017) tested 
removing internet access to seven smart home devices and found that four of the devices 
lost most of their smart features while the remaining three devices completely lost 




network traffic of some smart devices without losing any functionality (Copos et al., 
2016b; Notra et al., 2014; Vijay Sivaraman et al., 2015). Sivaraman et al. (2014) and 
Notra et al. (2014) both were able to block the Nest’s Smoke Alarm from sending logs to 
its Cloud logging server while still allowing a home user to be alerted when the smoke 
alarm detected smoke. Copos et al. (2016) blocked the Nest Smoke Alarm’s access to all 
Cloud servers except for the Cloud servers responsible for authentication, notification, 
and token renewal. They set off the smoke alarm and successfully received a fire 
notification. 
Access Control 
 An Access Control List (ACL) could be used to block unwanted changes to smart 
home devices. An ACL is used to specify if a subject or an object is approved or denied 
for a specific action (Schuster et al., 2018a). Traditional ACLs have been used for smart 
home devices; the problem is they are not specific enough to be effective with smart 
home devices. Decisions need to be made based upon the situation in which a change is 
being requested, the context of the change, or even the state of the environment (He et al., 
2018; Jia et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2017a). Additionally, several different users interact 
with smart home devices, such as the family’s Alexa device or their smart lock connected 
to their front door (He et al., 2018). This would be fine if all users in the house should 
have the same type of access. He et al. (2018) points out that households often have very 
complex social relationships; there may be parents who want to spy on their teenagers, 
mischievous children, or even abusive partners (Matthews et al., 2017; Ur et al., 2014a). 
It is extremely important to take these relationships into consideration when populating 




He et al. (2018) found that it was important to their research participants that 
users be physically present in the house whenever they change a smart device’s behavior; 
68% of the participants felt that the user must be home to control the lights, unless it was 
the owner or the spouse making the change. Other major factors in deciding access 
control was the age of the person making the change, the time the change is requested, 
the status of the induvial making the change, and the location of the smart device in the 
home, all of which are not supported by current smart home devices (He et al., 2018; 
Ravidas et al., 2019). Access controls based upon situational conditions in not a new 
thing, smartphone frameworks have been using this for many years (Schuster et al., 
2018a). The main difference in ACLs between smartphones and smart home devices is 
that smartphones typically have one user and smart home devices have several users.  
Determining if the user is at home has been implemented by many smart home 
devices including: SmartThings, Nest, Ecobee, Wink, Apple HomeKit, Sennse Mother, 
Abode, Netatmo, and Honeywell (Schuster et al., 2018a). The two main ways to 
determine if the user is at home is the global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of the 
user’s smartphone and motion sensors on the smart home devices (Schuster et al., 2018a). 
The upside to the GPS location is that it is possible to uniquely identify the user since the 
user’s phone is directly linked to the user. The downside is it that it not only tracks if the 
user is at home, but also everywhere they go outside of their home. This creates privacy 
concerns, especially if the user’s location is shared with another smart home device that 
is simply attempting to determine if the user is home or not (Schuster et al., 2018a). The 
problem with the motion sensor is that it can only track if someone is home, not exactly 




Schuster et al. (2018) proposed environmental situation oracles (ESOs) which 
gather situational data from multiple smart home devices, such as the user’s GPS location 
and if a particular motion sensor was tripped. The ESOs can be queried by an ACL to 
determine if a particular situation exists or not. For example, there may be a rule that a 
teenager must be home to control the lights. The ACL could query the ESO containing 
the teenager’s GPS location. However, the ESO would not divulge the teenager’s GPS 
coordinates, instead it would respond true if they are home or false if they are out. The 
ESO solution is currently theoretical and has not seen much (if any) industry adoption. 
One of the most important features of an ACL is that it must be easy to use by a 
homeowner (Ravidas et al., 2019). Usability is particularly important since most home 
users have very little knowledge about security (Kim et al., 2011). Mahalle et al. (2013) 
developed a system modeled on a trust-based access control model designed to 
automatically set rules based on the trustworthiness of the user. Another system called 
Clairvoyant access right assignment (CARA), is designed to automatically give 
suggestions about the access rights a visitor to the home should have (Kim et al., 2011). 
One of the main constraints implemented by CARA is that the visitor must be in the 
house to access the device. Restricting the use of a device to only those physically present 
in the house is the main goal of this research project. Implementing an ACL is not a 
viable solution to the problem presented in this case since the attacker is masquerading as 
the home user; the attackers are using the victim’s username and password to gain access. 
ACLs are not designed to block access to a system due to a compromised account. 




 Network attacks against smart devices can be passive or active; malicious actors 
can passively monitor network traffic to exfiltrate sensitive information or they can attack 
the devices, which creates network traffic. Several researchers have trained machine 
learning algorithms to passively learn network traffic patterns generated by smart home 
devices, to piece together clues from the devices’ actions to infer the residents’ in home 
behaviors (Acar et al., 2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a; Apthorpe, 
Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Barrera et al., 2017b; Copos et al., 2016b; Junges et 
al., 2019; OConnor et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019a; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019). 
Other researchers have used an Intrusion Detection system to monitor for attacks on 
smart home devices (Anthi et al., 2019; Hodo et al., 2016; Mehdi Nobakht et al., 2016; 
Ramapatruni et al., 2019; Vijay Sivaraman et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2018). The types of 
attacks to monitor for include: 1) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), 2) conventional 
attack, 3) routing attack, and 4) man-in-the-middle (Zarpelão et al., 2017).  
Hodo et al. (2016) used a Network-Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) to 
identify and thwart DDoS attacks performed against smart home devices. The NIDS used 
an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) which was trained via a supervised learning 
procedure. This involved feeding the neural network with a labeled training set in order 
for it to learn the difference between normal and anomalous traffic (Hodo et al., 2016). 
Anthi et al. (2019) focused on detecting conventional attacks on smart home devices. The 
research involved establishing the normal behavior of each smart home device, 
identifying when an attack is occurring based on identified malicious packets, and 
determining the type of attack that is taking place against which smart home device. 




algorithms, such as Hidden Markov Models, to learn the normal traffic patterns of smart 
home devices. Using the normal traffic patterns as a baseline, Ramapatruni et al. (2019) 
identified any traffic outside the baseline as anomalous traffic. The researchers were 
successful 97% of the time in identifying malicious traffic.  
Sivaraman et al. (2015) extended this concept by dynamically quarantining smart 
home devices that were producing traffic determined to be malicious. This solution 
would be implemented though the use of Software Defined Networking (SDN).  SDN 
would allow for dynamic security rules, such as if someone is in the house or the time of 
day of an event, such as tuning on music at 2 a.m. Instead of implementing this solution 
in the house, Sivaraman et al. (2015) propose that a specialist, such as the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP), offer this service. The ISP would receive a feed of network 
traffic, learn the typical behavior of all of the smart devices and the residents’ interactions 
with the devices, tweaking the rules as more data was fed into it (Vijay Sivaraman et al., 
2015).  
 Routing attacks, the third type of attacks studied by researchers interested in 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for smart home devices, are designed to disrupt 
network traffic. One popular routing attack, the worm hole attack, disrupts network 
traffic by creating a network tunnel between two devices and  then sending all of the 
network traffic through the tunnel (Pongle & Chavan, 2015). This attack is typically 
found in smart devices outside the home. Pongle et al. (2015) created an IDS specifically 
to detect wormhole attacks. 
 In man-in-the-middle attacks, the attacker is able to intercept their adversary’s 




2019a). Researchers were able to gain access to a LightwaveRF smart home device via a 
man-in-the-middle attack in which they intercepted the device’s firmware update, 
modified the update so that they could easily access the device, then sent the update to 
the device (Barcena & Wueest, 2015). Tertytchny et al. (2019) created an IDS which was 
successful in identifying these attacks about 90% of the time. Nobakht et al. (2016) 
created a host-based intrusion detection system called IoT- Intrusion Detection Mitigation 
(IDM) designed to differentiate between suspicious and normal network activity and 
block identified suspicious activity. The researchers tested IoT-IDM with a Hue Smart 
Light Bulb system in which they were able to sniff the secret key, known as a whitelist 
token, which is used to authenticate a known user. The whitelist token was used by the 
simulated attacker, who was connected to the home network, to log into the Hue Smart 
Light Bulbs. IoT-IDM, using a learning model that leverages SVMs to classify the data, 
was able to identify the attack with an accuracy of 100%.  
Passive attacks involve capturing network traffic generated by smart home 
devices. Once captured, researchers have demonstrated that patterns identified by 
machine learning algorithms can show what the smart home device is doing, even if the 
network traffic is encrypted (Junges et al., 2019; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019). To 
train the machine learning algorithms researchers have used a variety of characteristics of 
the network traffic including: the throughput, burstiness, direction, size of payload, the 
proportion of synchronize (SYN) and acknowledgement (ACK) packets (which are 
involved in establishing a TCP connection), plus various statistics calculated about the 
network traffic (Acar et al., 2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a; Apthorpe, 




al., 2019; OConnor et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019a; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019). 
Apthorpe et al. (2017) were able to link device state changes to its network traffic for a 
variety of devices including the Amazon Echo, Nest Security Camera, and the Belkin 
WeMo Switch (see Figure 3 below). Acar et al. (2018) found a small discrepancy in 
traffic size between the Wemo Insight Switch being turned from on to off and from off to 
on (see Figure 4 below).  
 
Figure 3. Network traffic send and receive rates corresponding to user activities 





Figure 4. Wemo Insight Switch’s network traffic volume when switched from on to off 
and then from off to on (Acar et al., 2018) 
 
This type of attack is similar to the research in this paper, but differs in that the 
attack in this research is accomplished through an account takeover by someone who is 
not connected to the home network and is performing the attack from somewhere on the 
Internet. Therefore, this research tested the worthiness of each of these characteristics. An 
in-depth explanation of each characteristic listed above can be found in the 
Methodologies section of this paper. 
The attack outlined in this research is more in-line with typical account takeover 
attacks. This involves the malicious actor leveraging a user’s credentials. In this attack 
the malicious actor is not normally connected to the user’s home wireless network to 
perform the attack. Extensive research of current journal and conference papers on 
intrusion detection systems for smart home devices did not identify any research of how 
to prevent remote attackers who have gained compromised credentials, to take over smart 
home devices. This research intended to fill that gap. 
Summary 
 Smart home devices are rapidly being added to houses around the world. 
Researchers have discovered many concerning vulnerabilities with smart home devices 
and have demonstrated several successful attacks on the devices. Domestic abusers, who 
have been using technology to harass their victims, have started to adopt smart home 




Domestic abusers have followed the low-tech approach of commandeering a 
smart home device via a compromised username and password. This method is effective 
due to the architecture of most smart home devices, which involves state change requests 
of smart home devices going through the device’s Cloud server, then passed to the smart 
home device. Blocking a smart home device’s connection to the Cloud service is 
ineffective since researchers have determined that taking this approach renders most 
smart home devices useless.  
Intrusion detection systems have proved useful to most traditional types of active 
attacks against smart home devices. Passive attacks can be successful in learning about a 
households’ activities by learning the traffic patterns generated by smart home devices. A 
compromised cannot be defended against with the methods researchers developed for 
passive or active attacks. This is also true for access control lists. ACLs are effective at 
restricting what type of access a user has to a device based on a number of factors. A 












This research was carried out following an experimental design through a lab 
experiment. The main goal was to identify state change requests sent over a network from 
an app on a smart phone to the smart home device’s Cloud site. Researchers have found 
that the payload of this network traffic is typically encrypted (Acar et al., 2018; Alrawi et 
al., 2019a; Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Bezawada et al., 2018; Junges et 
al., 2019; Miettinen et al., 2017a; OConnor et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019a; Sivanathan et 
al., 2017; Subahi & Theodorakopoulos, 2019). Therefore, network traffic patterns were 
studied to see if state change requests generate identifiable patterns.  
This was accomplished by selecting specific attributes, also known as features, 
which can be represented as follows. 
𝐸"	 = {𝐹, 𝐷, 𝐿} 
E, represents the extracted features and T represents the time interval. F are the 
features of the traffic sent to the smart home device to initiate a state change, 𝐹 =
{𝑓!	, 𝑓$, … , 𝑓&}	in which 𝑓'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a feature. D is the set of smartphones 
and tablets, and L is used to denote location of where a change request originated. The 




which are the most successful in identifying state changes hidden in the encrypted 
payloads across several types of smart home devices.  
The Scikit-Learn platform was used for machine learning (Scikit-Learn 0.22.2, 
2020). This included the Juypter notebook to store and run the machine learning tasks, 
Python as the primary programming language, and the numpy and pandas libraries 
(NumPy — NumPy, 2020; Pandas 1.0.3, 2020).  
Four popular smart home devices were included in this research. The criteria for 
selecting these devices is that they must connect to the home WiFi network and must be 
controlled by its corresponding Cloud server. Additionally, at least one device was 
included from the following rough categories: 1) a device that has a simple behavior 
(turns on and off), 2) a device with a complex behavior (can be turned on for a set 
amount of time), and 3) sends a large amount of data (i.e. video camera). The selection of 
these smart home devices depended on the availability of publicly available datasets from 
previous research. The publicly available datasets did not prove adequate, meaning it did 
not having enough network traffic captures of smartphone to smart device interactions, so 
simulation data was created. This was accomplished by setting up our own lab with the 
smart home devices on a home WiFi network and capturing the network traffic while 
generating numerous state change behaviors of each smart home device.    
This research followed the typical steps involved in training a machine learning 
algorithm. An overview of the steps is listed below with a detailed explanation of each 
step following this list. 
1. Get the data 




b. Capture or acquire the network traffic 
c. Sample a test set 
2. Explore the data 
a. Create a copy of the data for exploration 
b. Study each attribute and its characteristics 
c. Identify the target attribute 
d. Label the data 
e. Convert the data for Scikit-Learn 
f. Visualize the data 
g. Study the correlations between attributes 
h. Identify the promising transformations 
3. Prepare the data 
a. Data cleaning 
b. Feature selection, feature engineering, and feature scaling 
i.  𝐹 = {𝑓!	, 𝑓$, … , 𝑓&}	in which 𝑓'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a 
feature 
ii. One goal of this research is to identify subsets of F, 
represented by R, that can be used to identify state changes 
effectively and efficiently. 𝑅 = {𝑟!	, 𝑟$, … , 𝑟(}	in which 
𝑟'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) represents a subset of F 
4. Identify promising models 
a. Train many models using standard parameters, represented as the 




classifier. The goal is to identify which subset S (S	 ⊆ C), when 
trained with R performs the best 
b. Measure and compare their performance 
c. Analyze the most significant variables for each algorithm 
d. Analyze the types of errors the models make 
e. Repeat the five previous steps for each smart home device’s 
network traffic and then for all of the smart home devices’ network 
traffic combined 
f. Select the top three to five most promising models 
5. Fine-Tune the System 
a. Fine-tune the hyperparameters using cross-validation 
b. Try Ensemble methods 
c. Estimate the generalization error 
(Géron, 2019) 
Step 1: Get the data 
There were two main datasets to evaluate. One dataset was provided by Alrawi et 
al. (2019). The researchers evaluated 45 devices from several disparate categories 
including appliances, cameras, home assistants, media and network devices. They 
collected network traffic over a period of 13 days which resulted in 150 GB of data. 
The second dataset came from the work of Ren et al. (2019). The full dataset 
includes network traffic captured from 81 different smart home devices located in labs in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Over the period of a month they conducted 




As mentioned previously, the publicly available datasets did not provide enough 
instances of encrypted network traffic between the smart home device’s app and the 
smart home device’s Cloud site so the data was supplemented by generating and 
capturing our own network traffic. The network traffic generated by the smart home 
device apps were captured using tcpdump on the home router (in this case a router 
running the OpenWRT operating system) (OpenWrt Project, 2020; Tcpdump, 2017). It 
was necessary to generate our own supplemental network captures, so the same method 
was used as Apthorpe et al (2017). Each device was isolated on its own network, and all 
possible means of triggering the device were explored. 
Once all the device’s states were triggered, the network traffic generated by the 
device was analyzed for uniqueness. The same behavior was triggered and again 
compared to the previous network traffic. A similar method was used by Copos et al. 
(2016), in which they found that packets of a certain size were sent when the Nest motion 
sensor was tripped which allowed them to determine with 88% accuracy that the sensor 
was tripped.  
Smart home devices can be roughly grouped into three, possibly overlapping, 
categories: 1) those with simple behaviors (i.e. smart plugs which can be turned on or 
off), 2) more complex behaviors (i.e. smart watering systems that be set to turn on for a 
set amount of time), and 3) those that send large amount of data (i.e. Alexa sending a 
voice recording and Ring sending a video clip). Experiments with smart home devices 
from each of these categories were conducted. The list of devices includes: 1) TP-Link 
smart plug (simple behavior), 2) the Belkin WeMo switch (simple behavior), 3) the 




of data), 5) Rachio Smart Sprinkler Controller (complex behavior). These devices were 
selected because they are popular smart home devices and several of them were used in 
the publicly available dataset from Alrawi et al.(2019) and Ren et al.(2019). Some of the 
devices listed proved to be less than ideal candidates. 
Step 2: Explore the data 
Researchers have used the tool Zeek (formerly known as Bro) to assist in 
interpreting the network traffic (Copos et al., 2016b; Paxson, 1999). Zeek can be used to 
read in a pcap file and then produce a list of all connections including information about 
the source, destination, protocol used for the connection, duration, and number or bytes 
sent. Therefore, Zeek was used in this research to examine connection patterns in the 
publicly provided network capture files from Alrawi et al.(2019) and Ren et al.(2019). 
This helped identify which packet captures, and specifically which parts of those packet 
captures, involved an interaction between a smart device and the smart home device’s 
Cloud server. Once these interactions were identified, Wireshark was be used to study 
each attribute and its characteristics; the IP address of the Cloud site was identified, the 
domain that the IP belonged to, the protocol used for communication, if the payload was 
encrypted or not, the size of the payload, and how many transactions occurred during 
each session (Wireshark, 2020). 
Once all of the possible smart device state changes were correlated to specific 
network traffic, the traffic was labeled to start training a machine learning algorithm. This 
step was particularly challenging since the publicly available data is not currently labeled. 
It was necessary to identify patterns in the encrypted network traffic indicative of a state 




smart home devices in our test environment and comparing the traffic generated for each 
state change request to the traffic in the publicly available network traffic. The traffic 
patterns in the publicly available network traffic that match the traffic patterns in our test 
environment would have been labeled as state changes. Unfortunately, no state changes 
made by a smartphone were identified in the publicly available dataset. Therefore, a lab 
environment was set up and traffic was generated on the smart home devices listed 
above. 
The steps to identify the state changes included exporting the network capture out 
of Wireshark as a comma separated value (CSV) file and then importing it into Microsoft 
Excel (Microsoft Excel, 2019). In Excel, a filter was applied to the data allowing us to 
separate network packets that include state change requests sent from the smart device to 
the Cloud site and unrelated network packets. A column was created in Excel to for the 
label. The value “1” was inserted into the label column for packets that involve a state 
change and a “0” for the rest.  
Once this task was completed, the CSV was ready to be loaded into the Jupyter 
environment (Jupyter Notebook 6.0.3, 2020). This was done with a Pandas function 
which reads the csv into a Pandas dataframe. The Pandas dataframe is a two dimensional 
data structure that is comparable to the structure of a spreadsheet; the dataframe is 
comprised of rows and columns. The Pandas dataframe is the main container type used 
for all phases of machine learning (i.e. the cleaning, training, and analyzing steps) in the 
Scikit-Learn platform (Géron, 2019).   




One of crucial steps with machine learning, and therefore this research, was 
feature selection, formally represented as the set 𝐹 = {𝑓!	, 𝑓$, … , 𝑓&}	in which 
𝑓'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a feature. Feature selection involved identifying all of the 
relevant characteristics of the home network traffic that were indicative of a state change 
request sent from a smart home device’s app running on a smart device to a smart home 
device’s Cloud site. State changes could be found in the payload of the packet. Therefore, 
network traffic attributes were selected as features to effectively train machine learning 
algorithms to identify patterns indicative of smart device state change requests. Table 1, 
below, summarizes the promising features, by category, including a reference to the 
research that implemented said feature. 
Table 1 
Network Data Flow Features 
Category Feature Reference 
Statistical Average bytes per session from the client 
and from the server      
OConnor et al. (2019); 
Ren et al. (2019) 
Statistical Maximum bytes per session from the 
client, and from the server 
OConnor et al. (2019); 
Ren et al. (2019) 
Statistical Standard deviation of bytes between 
server sequences 
OConnor et al. (2019) 
Statistical Standard deviation of bytes between IoT 
device sequences 
OConnor et al. (2019) 
Statistical Median absolute deviation of packet size Acar et al. (2018) 
Statistical Mean and standard deviation of the 
amount of traffic (bytes) sent or received 
by the device in consecutive s-second 
samples   
Apthorpe, Reisman, & 
Feamster (2017) 
Statistical Burstiness 
the proximity of arrival instances within 
each other plus the variance between each 
arrival. It is measured by examining the 
variance in terms of both payload size and 
inter-arrival times 




Aggregated Aggregate bytes per session from the 
client and the server 
OConnor et al. (2019) 
Aggregated Kurtosis with respect to packet sizes and 
inter-arrival times Ren et al. (2019) 
Aggregated The distribution of inter-packet 
intervals 
Apthorpe, Reisman, 
Sundaresan, et al. (2017) 
Aggregated Skewness with respect to packet sizes 
and inter-arrival times 
Ren et al. (2019) 
Synthesized deciles of the distribution with respect 
to packet sizes and inter-arrival times 
Ren et al. (2019) 
Synthesized IAT bin (a representation of traffic 
rate) bin index of packet inter-arrival 
time (IAT) using three bins: < 0:001 
ms, 0:001 ms to 0:05 ms, and > 0:05 
ms 
Nguyen et al. (2019); 
Subahi & 
Theodorakopoulos (2019) 
Synthesized Mean inter-arrival time Acar et al. (2018) 
Synthesized The total number of packets in a flow Apthorpe et al. (2017); 
Bezawada et al. (2018) 
Synthesized total time of connection OConnor et al. (2019) 
Protocol 
specific 
The proportion of SYN and ACK 
packets per flow  
Flow is a set of packets associated 
with a 5-tuple of sender_ip, 
recipient_ip, sender_port, 
recipient_port, and protocol within 
some time window 
Apthorpe et al. (2017) 
Protocol 
specific 




Synchronicity, the observed 
measurements that describe how a 
client and server take turns sending 
data 
OConnor et al. (2019) 
Protocol 
specific 
Synchronicity within the context of a 
session OConnor et al. (2019) 
Protocol 
specific 
Synchronicity of server sequences per 
session OConnor et al. (2019) 
 
It is important to know if the same features, trained with the same machine 
learning classifiers, provide the best results across all types of smart home devices. Or is 




was to identify which features, F, combined with which machine learning algorithm, 
provide the most optimal identification of state changes, across all types of smart home 
device. In other words, identify the subsets of F, denoted as R, that performs best with a 
machine learning algorithm: 
𝑅 = {𝑟!	, 𝑟$, … , 𝑟(}	in which 𝑟'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) represents a subset of F 
Statistical features have proven to work well with devices that have simple 
behaviors. As mentioned above, Acar et al. (2018), found that traffic size could be used 
to identify when a smart plug was turned on and off. Junges et al. (2019), were successful 
in determining state change requests of smart plugs and smart lamps by using the 
encrypted payload size as their main feature.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of published research that has 
focused primarily on identifying the behavior of smart home devices with complex 
behaviors. Complex behavior of a smart home device is defined here as being able to 
choose to switch the device between more than two states (i.e. more than turning a light 
from on to off). An example is the Rachio smart sprinkler system which allows the user 
to turn the sprinklers on for five minutes. The Rachio accepts the request, turns the water 
on, then responds back when the five minutes of watering has completed. In order train a 
machine learning algorithm to identify this pattern, more complex features must be used 
than the statistical features described above. In this case, it was believed that synthesized 
features, such as total number of packets in a flow, would be most useful. Therefore, 
network traffic flow was a big focus. This helped identify time intervals between TLS 
sessions, which is important when identifying when a smart device state change request 




Ren et al. (2019) found that aggregated features are effective in inferring 
interactions from devices that that send a large amount of data such as cameras, 
televisions, and audio devices. Although their goal was not to identify the optimal 
classifier, but to simply understand if the devices’ activities are inferable.  
Most fine-grained features did not help with identifying device state changes. 
However, several assisted in identifying the smart device requesting the change and the 
smart home device’s Cloud site that the change request is sent to. Therefore, some fine-
grained features were selected such as destination IP address and source MAC address. 
Source and destination ports were also used as features to identify when an encrypted 
payload is being sent. 
The combinations of all the aforementioned features were tested in order to 
identify the ideal combination that performs best across all types of smart home devices. 
This involved testing several combinations of the feature sets as highlighted in Table 2 
below. 
Table 2 
Possible Combinations of Feature Types 
Feature type A Feature type B Feature type C 
Statistical Synthesized Aggregated 
Statistical Aggregated Protocol specific 
Statistical  Protocol specific Synthesized 
 
Step 4: Identify promising models 
The sets of features were used to train machine learning algorithms, also known 




with statistical, aggregated, synthesized or protocol specific features, performed best with 
traffic from smart home devices that have simple behavior, complex behavior, and send a 
lot of data. The classifiers can be formally represented as the set 𝐶 = {𝑐!	, 𝑐$, … , 𝑐)}	in 
which 𝑐(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘) represents a classifier. The goal was to identify which c, when 
trained with f performs the best: 
S	 ⊆ C 
S represents a subset of classifiers that produces the most accurate predictor out of 
the tested classifiers combined with the R, the selected features used to train the 
classifiers. 
Acar et al. (2018) obtained an 88% accuracy of correctly detecting activities using 
Random Forest (RF) and 91% using KNN. Ren et al. (2019) trained a RF machine 
learning classifier. Junges et al. (2019) were able to train a KNN classifier to identify 
actions with a high accuracy of up to 98.4%. Therefore, this research project used the 
KNN algorithm to correlate smart device activity to network traffic, and explored other 
supervised learning algorithms such as RF and naïve Bayes.  
 
Step 5: Fine-Tune the System 
Several evaluations were performed to test the accuracy of the predictor. A root 
mean square error will be computed using numpy’s built in mean_squared_error function 
(Géron, 2019). The function is: 










g is the number of instances in the dataset that are measuring the RMSE on. 𝑥(") is 
a vector of all of the feature values of the ith instance in the dataset, with 𝑦(") representing 
its label. X is a matrix containing all of the feature values of all instances in the dataset. h, 
also called the hypotheses, is the system’s prediction function.  
This ran against all of the predictors; several predictors were created by 
combining features and running them through various machine learning classifiers.  
Also, Scikit-Learn’s K-fold cross validation feature was implemented. This 
feature randomly splits the training set into a set number of folds, which are distinct 
subsets of the training set. It then trains a classifier a set number of times, choosing a 
different fold for evaluation and using the other folds for training. The output is an array 
containing the evaluation score for all of the runs. 
To identify correlations between features the standard correlation coefficient 
between every pair of features was computed. When the results were close to one, there 
was a strong positive correlation and when the result was close to negative one, there was 
a strong negative correlation. Scikit-Learn’s corr() function was used to perform this 
calculation. 
One very quick and effective test for accuracy is called the precision of the 




𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃		 
TP is the number of true positives and FP is the number of false positives. 
Precision is usually used in conjunction with recall, also known as sensitivity or the true 






𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁		 
FN is the number of false negatives. 
The harmonic mean of precision and recall, which is the 𝐹! score, was computed. 
It is different than precision in that it gives much more weight to low values. This results 
in only getting a high 𝐹! score if both recall and precision are high. The formula is: 
𝐹! = 2	 ×	
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	 × 	𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 	= 	
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 +	𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃2
 
Finally, a confusion matrix was used to count the number of incorrect 
classifications. For example, it showed the number of times network traffic was 
incorrectly identified as containing a state change request for a smart home device. 
Scikit-Learn’s cross_val_predict function will be used for the confusion matrix. 
Preliminary Experiment 
 The dataset used for this preliminary experiment came from the work of Ren et al. 
(2019). A test case focused on network traffic generated by a Wemo plug over two 
separate dates. The researchers generated several GetBinaryState events in which the 
Wemo plug responded with its current state which is either on or off.  The traffic and the 
payload were not encrypted, making it easy to identify the exact packets responsible for 
the GetBinaryState events. This was used to create an accurate label for the data.  
The basis of this research was to learn the state change hidden in an encrypted 
payload. Since an encrypted payload cannot be read, it would not make sense to include 
an unencrypted payload in this test data. Therefore, the field containing the payload 




The packet captures from April 24, 2019 was used to train the Random Forest 
Regressor and the packet capture from April 25, 2019 was used to test the resulting 
predictor. This was all performed in the Jupyter notebook environment using the Pandas 
and Numpy Python libraries to load and prepare the dataset. Once trained, the accuracy of 
the predictor will be tested using the mean square error formula. The result was zero, 
which indicates a perfect prediction. To double check this, the predicted output was 
compared to the test case and they were both identical.  
The next step was to learn which features were the most important in training the 
predictor. In other words, which features had the highest correlations. The results, listed 
in Table 3 below, indicate that the Source and Destination ports are more correlated (.15) 
to GetBinaryState than Length is (.08). This is surprising since previous research placed a 
high emphasis on payload size to indicate a state change. This was be re-tested and 




No. Time Length Src port Dest port GetBinaryState 
No. 1.000000 0.999861 0.009366 0.019650 0.017530 0.001433 
Time 0.999861 1.000000 0.009378 0.019745 0.017695 0.001206 
Length 0.009366 0.009378 1.000000 -0.374397 -0.405949 0.086608 
Src 





No. Time Length Src port Dest port GetBinaryState 
Dest 




0.001433 0.001206 0.086608 0.158049 0.157310 1.000000 
  
This preliminary experiment showed promise that the research methods listed 
above were valid. It was important during the experiment portion of this research, to test 
several different features, with several different machine learning classifiers, to discover 
the optimal combination, to identify state changes hidden in the encrypted payload of 
network traffic. This research successfully discovered this combination. 
Resources 
Two main datasets were evaluated; one dataset provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) 
and the other by Ren et al. (2019). Evaluation of the datasets were done using Wireshark, 
Zeek, and Microsoft Excel. Since more data was necessary, network traffic was captured 
in a lab environment using tcpdump running on an OpenWRT router. The lab 
environment includeed the following smart home devices: Belkin WeMo switch, TP-Link 
WiFi Smart Plug, Rachio Smart WiFi Sprinkler Controller, the Chamberlain myQ garage 
door opener, and Amazon’s Ring video camera. 
Scikit-Learn was used to prepare the data, train the classifiers, and fine tune the 





 In summary, the research for the detection of rogue manipulation of smart home 
devices, involved the following steps: 
1. Identify potential network traffic features that will enable the identification of 
smart home device state changes hidden in the encrypted payloads 
2. Explore the publicly available network traffic datasets provided by Ren et al. 
(2019) and Alrawi et al. (2019) 
3. Generate our own network traffic in our lab environment with a set of smart home 
devices 
4. Train several machine learning algorithms with the identified feature sets 
5. Evaluate the results of the trainings 
6. Identify the machine learning algorithm, trained with one of the feature sets, that 














The main goal of this research was to categorize encrypted network traffic 
patterns originating from the user’s WiFi connected smart phone or tablet, indicative of 
state change requests of smart home devices. To accomplish this goal, the research was 
conducted in three major phases: 
1) focused on analyzing the publicly available network data captures provided by 
Alrawi et al. (2019), called YourThings, and the dataset published by Ren et al. 
(2019) called MonIoTrPublic, 
2) involved capturing the network traffic of several smart home devices’ apps and 
identifying the traffic patterns indicative of a state change request, 
3) included identifying network traffic features, using those features to train 
machine learning algorithms, evaluating the results of the trainings, and 
identifying the machine learning algorithm that performs the best across all of 
the selected smart home devices. The results of each phase will be addressed in 
this chapter. 
Phase 1 – Analysis of Publicly Available Datasets 
Publicly available network traffic captures of smart home devices were rigorously 




researchers who had published papers related to smart home devices. This resulted in the 
successful identification and obtainment of two datasets.  
One dataset was provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) as part of their YourThings 
initiative. The researchers evaluated 45 devices from several disparate categories 
including appliances, cameras, home assistants, media and network devices. They 
collected network traffic over a period of 13 days which resulted in over one thousand 
separate pcap files totaling 150 GB of data. The second dataset came from the work of 
Ren et al. (2019). The full dataset, referred to as MonIoTrPublic, includes network traffic 
captured from 81 different smart home devices located in labs in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. In-depth analysis of both datasets was performed. 
The YourThings dataset presented some significant challenges due to both the 
quantity of pcap files and total data collected. Therefore, it was determined that a 
database should be used since this is the best method to store and query large quantities 
of data. A fork of the MySQL database, called MariaDB was selected as the database. All 
of the pcap files were loaded into MariaDB. This involved converting the pcap file to csv 
format, which results in the loss of a significant amount of detail. However, all of the 
relevant data to identify state changes was maintained; the csv file contained information 
about the source and destination IP addresses, ports, protocol used, bytes sent, bytes 
received, and the information field that includes a summary of data sent in the packet. 
The main goal in evaluating the YourThings data in the MySQL database was to 
identify state change requests made from a smartphone or tablet. The SmartThings 
researchers included a mapping of device to IP address which helped with the initial 




mapping, SQL queries were created to determine on which of the capture days’ both the 
iPad and iPhone were used. Results showed that the iPad was used all four of the capture 
days (3/20/18, 3/21/18, 3/28/18, and 4/15/18) and the iPhone was used two of the days 
(3/21/18 and 3/28/18).  
The next step was to identify network traffic from the iPhone and iPad to either 
one of the smart home devices or the smart home devices’ Cloud sites. Once again, a 
SQL query was used which, not surprisingly, showed that both the iPhone and iPad 
generated a significant amount of outbound traffic to a multitude of various external IP 
addresses. It was not immediately apparent who owned the external IP addresses. To 
determine this, the Cloud sites for several of the smart home devices were identified, then 
a whois search was performed on each to determine who the IP range belonged to. This 
did not provide much useful information; most of the selected smart home devices host 
their Cloud server with Amazon’s AWS service. Therefore, most of the whois queries 
resulted in AWS as the owner of the IP address. This presented the challenge of 
differentiating traffic bound for the disparate smart device Cloud sites. Fortunately, when 
the smart device’s app on the iPad or iPhone is used, it generates a DNS query for the 
smart device’s Cloud site. Using the database to track down DNS queries from the 
iPhone and iPad and Wireshark to open the corresponding pcap file, the Cloud site for 
each of the smart devices was identified. 
Once the smart devices’ Cloud sites were identified, it was possible to tell each 
time that the smart device’s app was used on the iPhone or iPad. This only showed that 
the app sent traffic to the smart device’s Cloud site, not exactly what was sent (i.e. was 




requested, it was necessary to look for incoming traffic to the smart home devices and 
then see if that correlated to outbound traffic from the iPhone and iPad to the smart 
device’s Cloud site. Using the previously stated method of discovering each IP address 
and which smart device it belonged to, it was possible to identify each time a smart 
device talked to its Cloud server.  
Unfortunately, for all of the smart home devices listed above, there was not one 
instance when both the smart device’s app and the smart device were sending or 
receiving network traffic within the same timeframe (i.e. with five minutes of each other). 
In other words, it did not appear that a state change was requested on the app since there 
was a lack of traffic during the same timeframe between the smart device and its Cloud 
site. To reiterate, for the traffic that spanned the four capture days, there were hundreds of 
instances of outbound traffic from several smart devices’ apps to the Cloud sites and 
hundreds of instances of traffic to and from the smart devices to their Cloud sites. Yet, 
none of traffic overlapped in common timeframes. 
One possible reason for this lack of correlation could be that the smart hubs and 
motion sensors used in the project generated state changes to the smart home devices, 
instead of the state changes being requested by the app on the iPhone. The smart hubs 
and motion sensors include: the Samsung SmartThings Hub, Phillips HUE Hub, Insteon 
Hub, Belkin WeMo Motion Sensor, Wink Hub, Caseta Wireless Hub, Google Home, and 
Apple HomePod. These hubs and sensors are designed to directly control the smart home 
devices without the end user controlling the device via an app. 
It is possible to view the smart hub setup as delegitimizing this research since the 




However, it could also be argued that the setup used in the YourThings research project is 
advanced and not typical of most smart home device users today. The hub and sensor 
setup would require home users to purchase additional equipment, for several hundred 
dollars, plus the home user would need to know how to program the hubs and sensors to 
perform certain tasks for each corresponding event. This may be out of the technical 
know-how of most home users, since Fu et al., (2017) found that most home users are not 
tech savvy.  
Despite the limited use of hubs, it is possible that the techniques used in this 
research could be applied to identify state changes sent from a hub to a smart device’s 
Cloud site. Just like smart phones, hubs send state change requests over the home WiFi 
network to the device’s Cloud site. Therefore, machine learning algorithms could be 
trained to recognize state change patterns sent via encrypted network traffic from hubs 
similarly to the success this research had with state changes sent from smart phones. 
Additionally, there is a growing number of smart assistants which allow users to 
control their smart home devices via voice commands. For example, Amazon Alexa can 
be configured to allow a user to turn a smart switch on simply by speaking the command 
to the Alexa. The Alexa, just like a smart phone and a hub, then sends the state change 
request to the smart home device’s Cloud site over encrypted WiFi network traffic. Once 
again, it is possible that this research is applicable to discovering state changes sent from 
a smart assistant.  
The evaluation of the MonIoTrPublic dataset was accomplished in just a few 
steps. The MonIoTrPublic dataset contained network traffic for over twenty smart home 




Phase 2 – Capturing and Identifying Network Traffic of Smart Home Devices 
Since the two publicly available datasets did not contain any identifiable state 
changes made from a smartphone or tablet to a smart home device, it was necessary to set 
up a lab to capture this traffic. The focus of this research was to identify state changes 
across three types of categories of smart home devices: 1) has a simple behavior (turns on 
and off), 2) has a complex behavior (can be turned on for a set amount of time), and 3) 
sends a large amount of data (i.e. video camera). Therefore, smart home devices were 
selected across those three categories.  
Selecting the Smart Home Devices 
For the simple behavior, the TP-Link WiFi Plug and the Chamberlain myQ 
Garage Opener were selected. The TP-Link WiFi Plug is only capable of turning a switch 
on and off, while the Chamberlain myQ Garage Opener’s sole purpose is to open and 
close a garage door. The Rachio Smart Sprinkler system is capable of turning the 
sprinklers on and off for varying amounts of time, which is a more complex behavior 
than simply turning something on and off or opening and closing something, so it was 
placed in the complex behavior category. Finally, Amazon’s Ring video camera 
constitutes a device that sends a large amount of data which fits the final category.  
Two other devices were initially selected but later excluded due to not being able 
to reliably identify their state change requests. The Belkin WeMo Switch, which was 
used in the preliminary tests for this research, previously sent state changes in 
unencrypted traffic but has since improved their security and now encrypts their traffic. 
All of the other smart home devices in this research encrypt their traffic as well, but 




WeMo Switch did not exhibit identifiable patterns that would allow for the labeling of 
state changes necessary to a train machine learning algorithm. This is also true for the 
Fujitsu Mini-Split heating and air conditioner. This device was initially included since it 
allows the user to change several different settings of the system, putting it in the 
complex behavior category. To include these two devices in future research it would be 
necessary to either decrypt the network traffic or work with the manufacturer to 
understand how their systems function. 
Table 4 









1.5.6 Turn a plug on and 
off 






A.0.4.12 Open and close a 
garage door 






5-115 Turn on a sprinkler 
system to various 
amount of time 







Switch to live mode 
to stream a live 
feed 







Turn a plug on and 
off 






2.4.5.1 Control a heating 
and air system by 
setting the 
temperature, fan 
speed, and more 









 The environment and method used to collect network traffic were based on the 
same methods used by Ren et al. (2019) and Alrawi et al. (2019). The environment, based 
on the lab setup of Alrawi et al. (2019), consisted of a GL.iNet Mini Travel Router 
running OpenWRT, an iPhone, and smart home device. During testing, the iPhone and 





Figure 5. Lab configuration with an iPhone running the smart home device’s app, the 
smart home device connected to a Mini Travel Router, and the Mini Travel Router 
connected to smart device’s Cloud site(s) 
 
 The method used to capture the traffic followed what Ren et al. (2019) termed 
interaction experiments. This involved interacting with the IoT device via the app on the 
iPhone. For each interaction, the device would be turned on, and then two minutes later 
the network capture would be initiated. The capture would continue during the entire time 
the state change, or changes, took to complete, then after an additional 5-15 seconds, the 
capture would be stopped (Ren et al., 2019b).  
The following are the exact steps taken for each network capture: 




2. Configure the smart home device to connect to the mini router 
3. SSH into the mini router from a MacBook Pro 
4. Launch the tcpdump utility on the mini router 
5. Disconnect the MacBook Pro from the mini router 
6. Launch the smart device’s app on the iPhone 
7. In the app, make a state change to the smart home device (i.e. turn the smart 
switch off) 
a. In some cases, repeatedly perform this action 
b. In some cases, don’t perform any state changes in the app which will be 
used to differentiate between state change traffic and all other traffic 
c. Record the time the state change was made 
8. SSH back into the mini router from the MacBook Pro and copy the pcap file to 
the MacBook Pro for analysis 
Identifying State Changes 
 The next step was to analyze the network traffic in order to identify the state 
changes that were made. To accomplish this, the network analysis tools Zeek and 
Wireshark were leveraged. Zeek was used to summarize each connection. The utility 
creates several files detailing information about the network traffic such as the source and 
destination of each connection, how much data was sent, the protocol that was used, and 
several other informative fields (see Appendix A).  
 All of the outbound connections from the iPhone were analyzed using Zeek, 
which includes a feature to parse pcap files creating several log files (Copos et al., 2016a; 




of Flosbach et al. (2019), who successfully parsed pcap files using Zeek. One of the log 
files that was created, the conn.log files, records connection information of the network 
and transport layer including information such as when a connection occurred, for how 
long, the protocol used, and several other details (see example data in Table 5 below). 
This information was used to identify traffic patterns for each device. A detailed account 
of how each pattern was identified for each device is detailed in the sections below. Once 
the state change patterns were identified, they would be validated by matching the state 
change patterns in the network traffic with the recorded times a state change was made on 
the app on the iPhone. If the times matched up, then it was more likely that the identified 
state change was a true positive and not a false positive. 
Table 5 
Example of fields and values produced by Zeek on network traffic sent between an iPhone 
a smart device’s Cloud site 
Field Value 
time stamp 2020-06-26T14:23:21-0700 
source IP 192.168.8.248 
source port 55451 
destination IP 13.83.97.206 
















To add further evidence that the traffic pattern was indicative of a state change, 
network traffic sent between the smart home device and its Cloud site was analyzed. 
Since the mini router captured all of the network traffic, not just the traffic between the 
smartphone and the Cloud site, the traffic between the smart home device and the Cloud 
site was contained in the same conn.log file as was used in the previous step. The 
timestamp of the identified state change event was correlated with the timestamp of a 
connection, or connections, made from the smart home device to its Cloud site (see Table 
6 below). If the identified state change traffic was sent to the Cloud site within a given 
timeframe of traffic being sent between the smart home device and the Cloud site, then 
this further legitimizes that it is indeed a state change. Junges et al. found that sessions 
are usually within 2.5 seconds of each other (Junges et al., 2019). Therefore, if the state 
change request sent from the smartphone and the state change sent from the Cloud to the 
smart home device are within 2.5 seconds of each other, then they will be considered 
linked. 
Table 6 
Example of fields and values produced by Zeek on network traffic between a smart device 
and its Cloud site 
Field Value 
time stamp 2020-06-26T14:23:21-0700 
source IP 20.42.27.108 
source port 8883 
destination IP 192.168.8.206 
destination port 50854 
protocol tcp 













server name Microsoft Corporation (MSFT) 
 
 Once all of the state changes were confirmed a label was added to mark the state 
changes. For each device a separate number was used to represent a state change; a one 
was used for TP-Link, a two was used for the Ring, a three for the Rachio, and a four was 
used for the myQ device. Next, all of the labeled data per device was combined into one 
csv file. These files contained the network traffic captures for each device combined with 
the captures that did not have state changes. 
iPhone versus Android app state change patterns 
This research chose to run the smart device’s app on an iPhone and not an 
Android device. While it is possible that the Android app is programmed differently, it is 
highly unlikely that an entirely separate Cloud infrastructure is implemented since smart 
home device manufacturers often leverage software development kits (SDKs) provided 
by smart home platform providers, such as Amazon’s AWS IoT service (Zhou et al., 
2019). This would indicate that the Cloud infrastructure remains the same between 
smartphone apps, which lends credence to the notion that the mobile app would behave 
similarly across platforms. 
Identifying State Changes of TP-Link State Changes 
 The state change requests for the TP-Link WiFi Plug were the easiest out of all 
the smart home devices to identify. To establish a pattern, the plug was turned on or off 
24 times, spread relatively evenly, over a period of three days (6/20/20, 6/22/20, and 




to off or from off to on, a new connection was created between the iPhone and the TP-
Link WiFi Plug directly. The traffic sent was encrypted, however the values of the 
attributes id.resp_p, orig_bytes, and resp_bytes were identical every time the plug was 
switched from off to on and from on to off (see Table 7 below). It is worth noting that 
there is no guarantee that these values will always remain the same. If the vendor changes 
the encryption algorithm that they use or makes alterations to their code controlling the 
state changes, it is very likely that different values will be used. However, it is possible 
that if the aforementioned changes are made, new patterns will emerge which could then 
be used to identify state changes. 
Table 7 
iPhone to TP-Link WiFi Plug captured traffic of a state change, made on the iPhone 
(192.168.8.248), to the TP-Link  device(192.168.8.247) 
  
Second, the app would communicate with the following TP-Link Cloud sites: n-
use1-wap.tplinkcloud.com, n-wap.tplinkcloud.com, and api.tplinkra.com. If the app was 
simply opened and no state change was made, there would be no connection made to the 
TP-Link plug. However, the app would connect to the same three TP-Link Cloud sites 
listed above.   
Identifying State Changes of Chamberlain myQ Garage Opener 
Orig host IP Orig 
port 










192.168.8.248 52791 192.168.8.247 9999 tcp 0.188 106 49 SF 
192.168.8.248 52792 192.168.8.247 9999 tcp 0.250 106 49 SF 
192.168.8.248 52794 192.168.8.247 9999 tcp 0.190 106 49 SF 




The Chamberlin myQ Garage Opener app behaved more similarly to a typical 
smart home device app since it did not communicate directly with the myQ device 
directly, instead it communicated state changes to the myQ Cloud site. Notra et al. (2014) 
made this observation several years ago, and based on our experiments, this is still true 
today. In this experiment ten separate state changes, in the form of opening or closing the 
garage door, were captured over four days (6/12/20, 6/13/20, 6/23/20, and 7/20/20). A 
pattern emerged in which the app on the iPhone communicated with the account-devices-
gdo.myq-cloud.com Cloud site whenever the door was either opened or closed. The 
Cloud site consistently had the IP address 13.83.240.23 in our experiments (see Table 8 
below). This is unusual behavior since in the network captures for the other smart home 
devices, the IP address associated with a Cloud site would change for each capture and 
sometimes several different IP addresses were used during the same capture. 
Table 8.  
Connections involving state changes sent from the iPhone to the myQ Cloud site (this table 
is abbreviated, the full table can be found in Appendix A) 
Resp host IP Duration Orig 
bytes 








13.83.240.23 0.3476 1121 5746 S1 ShADTad
t 
24 3490 24 12732 
13.83.240.23 0.3241 1248 5746 S1 ShADTad
t 
24 3744 24 12732 
13.83.240.23 0.4003 1248 5746 S1 ShADTad
t 
22 3640 24 12732 
13.83.240.23 1.0862 1174 434 S1 ShADTad
t 
20 4422 20 1900 
13.83.240.23 0.4760 1249 5746 S1 ShADTad
t 
24 3746 24 12732 
13.83.240.23 0.3590 1249 5746 S1 ShADTad
t 
24 3746 24 12732 
  
Another pattern can be observed in the state changes listed in Table 8. Most of 




fourth row: the duration, origination bytes sent, response bytes, connection state, history, 
origination packets, origination IP bytes, response bytes, and response IP bytes are all in 
the same range.  
To validate that the pattern was indicative of a state change request, the recorded 
time that the state change was made on the iPhone matched up with the time listed in 
Table 8 above. Additionally, the time the change request was seen in the traffic from the 
iPhone to the Cloud site correlates with traffic identified between the myQ device and the 
myQ device’s Cloud site (see Table 9 below). Looking at the actual beginning and ending 
times of each connection, Wireshark shows that the app on the iPhone started its 
connection at 10:38:06.189218000 PDT and ended it at 10:38:06.430220000 PDT. This 
was almost immediately followed by the connection between the myQ device and the 
myQ Cloud site which lasted from 10:38:06.4895 PDT until 10:38:31.4370 PDT. 
Table 9. 
Sample state change traffic sent from the iPhone (192.168.8.248) to the myQ Cloud site 
(13.83.240.23) and then from the myQ Cloud site (20.42.27.108) to the myQ device 
(192.168.8.206)  
Timestamp Orig host IP Orig 
port 
Resp host IP Resp 
port 















20.42.27.108 8883 192.168.8.206 50854 tcp 24.947 85 425 OTH 14 
 
Identifying State Changes of Ring 
The state change for the Ring video camera is the act of putting the Ring into Live 
mode allowing the end user to view the live feed from the camera. Analysis of the 
network traffic led to the discovery that Ring uses the Real-time Transport Protocol 




(SIP) traffic, since it is responsible for setting up the connection between the Ring Cloud 
site and the iPhone. Table 10, below, shows the SIP traffic which is indicative of putting 
the Ring camera into Live mode captured over four different days (6/24/20, 7/5/20, 
7/12/20, and 7/13/20). This traffic was labeled as state changes and used to train the 
classifiers which is discussed later in this chapter.    
Table 10 
Four instances of network traffic containing Ring Live mode requests sent between the 
iPhone and the Ring Cloud site 
Resp host 
IP 
34.223.30.139 44.226.215.196 34.223.30.114 
Resp port 15064 15064 15064 
Proto tcp tcp tcp 
Duration 4.544156 14.338902 5.820299 
Orig bytes 4392 4437 4088 
Resp bytes 7451 7471 6753 
Conn state S1 S1 S1 
History ShADTadttT ShADTadttT ShADTadtTt 
Orig pkts 48 60 48 
Orig ip 
bytes 
11304 11922 10648 
Resp pkts 40 48 36 
Resp ip 
bytes 
16998 17454 15394 
 
Identifying State Changes of the Rachio Smart Sprinkler System 
The Rachio app was capable of performing a more complex behavior than simply 
turning a device on and off or opening or closing a door; the Rachio app allows a user to 
choose a sprinkler system zone to run and for how long it is to run. To start a “quick run” 
of the sprinklers, the mobile app first communicates with a server that resolves to api-
service-prod.us-west-2.elasticbeanstalk.com. Over SSL it sends out about 1,000 bytes and 




connecting to a second Cloud site identified as rach.io and sends 10,000 bytes of data and 
receives several tens of thousands of bytes from the Cloud server. One unique finding is 
that in some cases both the mobile app and the Rachio device both connected to the same 
Cloud site. 
This exact behavior was seen for 10 other “quick runs” performed over several 
different days (6/12/20, 6/23/20, 6/24/20, 7/5/20, and 7/13/20). To further validate this 
state change, a network traffic capture was performed in which the Rachio app on the 
mobile app was used to view the watering schedule, but not make any changes (like a 
“quick run”). This time the Cloud site identified as rach.io was not accessed, confirming 
that the Rachio app performs this identifiable pattern only when performing a quick run. 
To summarize, the only time the Cloud site identified as rach.io was accessed was when a 
quick run was requested. Therefore, network traffic connections between the mobile app 
and rach.io were labeled as state changes for the Rachio (see Table 11 below). 
Table 11 
Three instances of network traffic containing quick change requests sent between the 
iPhone and the Rachio Cloud site 
Resp host IP 34.213.56.42 34.213.56.42 52.32.41.198 
Resp port 443 443 443 
Proto tcp tcp tcp 
Duration 23.285352 28.606642 15.913739 
Orig bytes 9217 9239 9230 
Resp bytes 65852 66284 66837 
Conn state S1 S1 S1 
History ShADTadttT ShADTadttT ShADTadttT 
Orig pkts 208 202 190 
Orig IP bytes 29178 28934 28316 
Resp pkts 212 200 190 






Phase 3 – Train and Evaluate Machine Learning Algorithms to Identify State 
Changes 
 The main goal of this phase was to identify the combination of features, F, and 
machine learning classifiers, C, which are the most successful in identifying state changes 
hidden in the encrypted payloads across several types of smart home devices. This 
involved identifying the features where 𝐹 = {𝑓!	, 𝑓$, … , 𝑓&}	in which 𝑓'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) F is 
comprised of the connection summaries produced by the Zeek utility when run on the 
network traffic captures of the interaction experiments. The next step was to identify a 
subset of F. This was represented by R, where R = {r!	, r$, … , r*}	in which 
r+(1 ≤ i ≤ m), includes the most promising features that were identified to train the 
classifier,  C. This culminated in identifying which subset S (S	 ⊆ C) when trained with R 
performs the best. 
 The following steps were used to train the machine learning algorithms: 1) get the 
data, 2) explore the data, 3) prepare the data, 4) identify promising models, and 5) fine 
tune the system. Step 1 and 2 were covered above in Phase 2 – Capturing and Identifying 
Network Traffic of Smart Home Devices. The rest of the steps will be covered here. 
Prepare the Data 
One of crucial steps of this research is feature selection, F. The goal of this step 
was to identify 𝐹 = {𝑓!	, 𝑓$, … , 𝑓&}	in which 𝑓'(1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛). To ensure a robust feature set, 
features were selected from one of the three categories: 1) aggregated, 2) synthesized, 
and 3) protocol specific. This resulted in several features being selected from each 
category. The list of features selected by category can be found in Table 12 below. 




Features selected by category with a description of each feature 
 
Identify Promising Models 
The outcome of this step was to identify which c, when trained with f, produces 
the most accurate predictor out of the tested classifiers, S	 ⊆ C. Acar et al. (2018) 
obtained an 88% accuracy of correctly detecting activities using Random Forest (RF). 
Therefore, the RF algorithm was selected as a starting point. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of RF, a 4-fold cross validation was performed. This involved randomly 
Category Abbreviation Description 
Aggregated orig_pkts Number of packets that the originator sent 
Aggregated orig_ip_bytes Number of IP level bytes that the originator sent 
(as seen on the wire, taken from the IP total_length 
header field). 
Aggregated resp_pkts Number of packets that the responder sent. 
Aggregated resp_ip_bytes Number of IP level bytes that the responder sent 
(as seen on the wire, taken from the IP total_length 
header field). 
Synthesized history Records the state history of connections as a string 
of letters (such as  SO, Connection attempt seen, no 
reply, and SF, normal establishment and 
termination). 
Synthesized conn_state The state of the TCP connection which involves a 
combination of one, several, or none of the 
following packet types: SYN, ACK, FIN and RST 
Synthesized duration How long the connection lasted. For 3-way or 4-
way connection tear-downs, this will not include 
the final ACK. 
Protocol 
specific 
id.orig_p The originator's 4-tuple of endpoint port. 
Protocol 
specific 
id.resp_h The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint address. 
Protocol 
specific 
id.resp_p The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint port. 
Protocol 
specific 
proto The transport layer protocol of the connection. 
Protocol 
specific 
orig_bytes The number of payload bytes the originator sent. 
Protocol 
specific 





splitting the training set into five distinct subsets, training and evaluating the model 4 
times, picking a different fold for evaluation each time, and then training on the other 4 
folds. 
This step involved two phases: 1) training each smart home device individually 
with the selected features and RF, and 2) training with the combined set of smart home 
devices with all state changes labeled the same. The results all both phases by device are 
presented in the following sections. 
TP-Link RF Training 
 The first training of the RF classifier on the TP-Link device involved all 13 of 
selected features listed above. RF aggregates and then produces a mean of several 
Decision Trees all trained from different random subsets of the network traffic (James et 
al., 2013). The training data, the collection of which was described in phase 2 above, 
resulted in 430 instances of no state change requests and 24 instances of state change 
requests. It is important to reiterate that the training data, collected from the network 
traffic of all the smart home devices, contained instances of state changes, smart device 
app use but no state changes, and traffic from non-smart device apps. The TP-Link data 
was collected over a period of three days (6/20/20, 6/22/20, and 6/26/20). It is believed 
that the traffic patterns identified as state changes will stay the same until a major 
software change is applied. Therefore, three days of traffic was deemed sufficient. 
A 4-fold cross validation was performed resulting in cross validation scores of 
100% across all folds. The root mean square score was also 0 across all folds, with a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of zero. The recall, precision, and F! scores were 




 The next step was to reduce the number of features by identifying the most 
important features used to train the RF classifier. The Jupyter notebook environment 
using the Pandas and Numpy Python libraries was used during the entire machine 
learning process to identify the most important RF features. The most popular method 
used in this environment is an RF grid search (Géron, 2019). An RF grid search asks the 
RF classifier to rank each feature by order of importance. The code to perform this task is 
contained in the sklearn library GridSearchCV. The parameters for GridSearchCV were 
leaf_size set to 30, n_jobs of none, n_neighbors equal to two and p = 2. The results are 
listed in Table 13 and Figure 6 below. 
Table 13 
RF feature importance scores for TP-Link traffic 
Feature Value 
Resp bytes 0.28819812 
Orig bytes 0.11335768 
Orig IP bytes 0.09588693 
Resp IP bytes 0.08113802 
Resp port 0.06382875 
Resp pkts 0.03410074 
Orig pkts 0.02077022 

























































Figure 6. Feature importance scores for TP-Link traffic determined by the Random Forest 
classifier 
 
 The lead field, with over a quarter of the overall importance is resp_bytes, 
represents the number of payload bytes the responder sent. This is followed by the 
number of payload bytes the originator sent (orig_bytes) and the number of IP level bytes 
that the responder sent (orig_ip_bytes). With the feature set reduced down to three 
features, F = {resp_bytes, original_bytes, orig_ip_bytes}  a 4-fold cross validation with 
the RF classifier was run. Once again, this resulted in perfect scores for the cross 
validation across all folds, the root mean square score across all folds, and for the 
precision, recall, and F! scores. With perfect scores, it was obvious that the three 
identified features combined with the RF classifier could not be beat. 
myQ RF Training 
  Once again, the RF classifier was used with all 13 features. Also, the training data 
which included 1,216 connections without a state change and eight with a state change, 
was collected as outlined in phase 2 above. The identical 4-fold cross validation, used 
with the TP-Link device was used and resulted in cross validation scores of 100%, 
99.673%, 100%, and 99.346%. The root mean squared errors were 0, .228, 0, and .323. 
The mean was .138 with a standard deviation of .142.  The precision, recall, and F! 
scores were also all 100%. An RF grid search produced the results in Table 14 and Figure 
7 below. This indicated that the most important feature is the responding server’s IP 
address (id.resp_h), with over a quarter of the overall importance. The next two most 






RF feature importance scores for myQ 
Feature Value 
Resp host IP 0.273051817 
Orig bytes 0.178656021 
Duration 0.12654089 
Orig IP bytes 0.066071173 
Resp bytes 0.041034603 
Orig pkts 0.035720589 
Orig port 0.034761846 





Figure 7. Feature importance scores for myQ traffic determined by the Random Forest 
classifier 
 
 The RF classifier was run again with the three most important features F =
{id. resp_h, orig_ip_bytes, duration}. This resulted in cross value scores of 99.673%, 
100%, 100%, and 99.673%. Root mean square errors of 0, 0.228, 0, and 0.228, a mean of 
0.0571, and a standard deviation of 0.099. The precision, recall, and F! scores were also 
all 100%. This validated the most important features and resulted in a strong RF 
predictor. Attempting to reduce the number of features to less than the three listed above, 





































Ring RF Training 
Data collected from phase 2 was used to train the RF classifier. This included all 
13 features, with training data that included 463 connections without a state change and 
eight with a state change. The same 4-fold cross validation was repeated, resulting in 
cross validation scores of 100%, 99.152%, 100%, and 100 %. The root mean squared 
errors were 0, .184, 0, and .184. The mean was .054 with a standard deviation of .092.  
The precision, recall, and F! scores were also all 100%. An RF grid search produced the 
results in Table 15 and Figure 8 below. This indicated that the most important feature is 




RF feature importance scores for Ring 
Feature Value 
Resp port 0.203392693 
Orig IP bytes 0.10158929 
Resp IP bytes 0.09997153 
Duration 0.042720683 
Orig bytes 0.035100149 
Resp bytes 0.034483921 








Figure 8. Feature importance scores for Ring traffic determined by the Random Forest 
classifier 
 
The three most important features F = {id. resp_p, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes} 
were used to train the RF classifier resulting in cross value scores of 100%, 100%, 
99.236% and 100 %. Root mean square errors of 0, 0. 0.174, 0, and 0, a mean of 0.043, 
and a standard deviation of 0.075. The precision, recall, and F! scores were also all 
100%. This once again validated the most important features and resulted in a strong RF 
predictor. Attempting to reduce the number of features to less than the three listed above, 
resulted in lower precision, recall, and F! scores. 
Rachio RF Training 
 The final device was trained in the exact same way as the previous devices; the 
RF classifier was used with all 13 features, with training data that included 1,019 
connections without a state change and eleven with a state change from the data collected 
during phase 2. The 4-fold cross validation resulted in cross validation scores of 
98.449%, 99.224%, 99.221%, and 99.221%. The root mean squared errors were all .264. 
The mean was 0.264 with a standard deviation of .0003. The precision, recall, and F! 









































9 below. This indicated that the most important feature is orig_pkts, followed by 
resp_ip_bytes and orig_ip_bytes. 
Table 16 
RF feature importance scores for Rachio 
Feature Value 
Orig pkts 0.15045 
Resp IP bytes 0.12303946 
Orig IP bytes 0.11599227 
Resp pkts 0.09410367 





Figure 9. Feature importance scores for Rachio traffic determined by the Random Forest 
classifier 
 
The three most important features F = {orig_pkts, resp_ip_bytes, orig_ip_bytes} 
were used to train the RF classifier resulting in cross value scores of 98.44961%, 
99.225%, 99.222% and 99.222%. Root mean square errors of .374, .323, .265, and .265, a 
mean of 0.307, and a standard deviation of 0.046. The precision, recall, and F! scores 






































RF predictor. Once again, attempting to reduce the number of features to less than the 
three listed above, resulted in lower precision, recall, and F! scores. 
Combination of all the Devices’ Traffic 
 The culminating effort is to identify any state change, regardless of what device it 
was produced for, across all three types of smart home devices. All of the files from all of 
the device trainings listed above were combined. All of the state changes were labeled 
with a one. This resulted in a test set consisting of 3,128 connections without a state 
change and 51 with a state change. Once again, the same process was followed for 
training the classifiers on the state changes for each smart home device; the 4-fold cross 
validation was run to calculate the cross-validation scores, root mean squared errors and 
mean. Again, a confusion matrix was calculated, plus the precision, recall and F! score. 
This time three different classifiers, Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and K-Nearest 
Neighbors, were used across multiple combinations of features to identify which subset S 
(S	 ⊆ C) when trained with R performs the best. 
Random Forest on the Combination of all the Devices’ Traffic 
The 4-fold cross validation using RF resulted in cross validation scores of 
98.365%, 98.365%, 99.119%, and 99.244%. The root mean squared errors were .128, 
.1279, .094, and .094. The mean was .11087019 with a standard deviation of .0170055. 
The confusion matrix was also about the same `3128 020 31d, resulting in a precision score 
of 99.682%, recall score of 80.392%, and F! score of 87.645%. The next goal was to 
drastically improve these scores. To do so, the RF feature importance scores were used to 




features all had about the same importance rating, with the majority of features’ 
importance ranging between 7-9%. 
Table 17 
RF feature importance scores for all of the devices combined 
Feature Value 
Resp bytes 0.09419 
Orig IP bytes 0.0800405 
Resp IP bytes 0.07896994 
Orig bytes 0.0725435 
Orig port 0.07226243 
13.83.240.23 0.07168504 
Resp pkts 0.04634177 
Orig pkts 0.04617784 
 
 The top three features were chosen to rerun through the system (resp_bytes, 
orig_ip_bytes, and resp_ip_bytes). This resulted in cross value scores were 98.36478%, 
98.365%, 99.748%, and 99.496%. Root mean square errors of .128, .128, .050, and .071, 
a mean of .094, and a standard deviation of 0.034. The precision score was 99.651%, 
recall was 78.431%, and F! score of 86.07%. This was not much of an improvement. 
 In an attempt to improve the training of the system, a fourth feature was added, 
orig_bytes. This slightly improved most of the scores, but more importantly, had big 
effects on recall and on the F! score.  The recall score improved from 78.431% to 
87.254% and the F! score went from 86.07% to 92.59%. Both of these are very 
encouraging improvements.  
To see if these scores could be improved any further, the fifth feature, id.orig_p, 
was added. This resulted in almost perfect cross value scores of 99.057%, 99.214%, 
99.843%, and 99.213%. Root mean square errors of .089, 0.089, 0.039, and 0.069, a 




precision, recall and F! score. The precision was 99.900%, which is hard to improve. The 
recall was 93.902 % and the F! score was 96.703%. A summary of the features used and 
their scores can be found below in Table 18 and Figure 10. These results indicate that it is 
possible to identify state changes from disparate types of devices in the encrypted traffic 
sent from an iPhone to the smart devices’ Cloud sites. One interesting finding in the 
Table 18 below, is that the F! score is lower when all of the features were used to train 
the RF algorithm as opposed to when it is trained with a select subset of features. The 
reason for this could be that some of the features are misleading in terms of identifying 
state change patterns. When those misleading features were removed, then the F! score 
improved. 
Table 18 
Features used for RF training and their resulting scores 
Features Precision Recall 𝐅𝟏 





resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip 0.99650794 0.78431373 0.8607478
5 
All features 0.99698125 0.81372549 0.8840282
2 
All features except duration, 


















Figure 10. The Random Forest classifier trained on all device network traffic 
 
Naïve Bayes 
 The same exact training as discussed above was repeated, but this time with the 
Naïve Bayes classifier (NB), which uses conditional probability to assign the most likely 
class to an observation (James et al., 2013). To start the training, all of the features were 
used. This resulted in a very high F! score of .942. To see if it was possible to improve 
the scores and to reduce the number of features, several iterations of removing different 
features was performed (see Table 19 and Figure 11 below). The end result was that the 
F! score of .942 could not be beat. However, it was possible to achieve the same scores 
by removing three of the features leaving the following ten features: id.orig_p, id.resp_h, 
id.resp_p, proto, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, conn_state, history, orig_pkts, ip_bytes. 
Table 19 
Features used for Naïve Bayes training and their resulting scores 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1








id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes,
resp_ip_bytes






Set Features Precision Recall 𝐅𝟏 
 1 All 0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709 
 2 All except duration, conn_state, 
history, resp_pkts 
0.84459459 0.99632353 0.90615498 
 3 All except duration, conn_state, 
history 
0.84459459 0.99632353 0.90615498 
 4 All except resp_pkts 0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709 
 5 All except duration, resp_pkts 0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709 
 6 All except duration, resp_pkts, 
resp_ip_bytes 
0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709 
 7 All except duration, resp_conn_state, 
history, resp_pkts, resp_ip_bytes 
0.84459459 0.99632353 0.90615498 
 8 id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, 
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes 





Figure 11. The Naïve Bayes classifier trained on all device network traffic 
K-Nearest Neighbors 
 The final classifier to train with was k-nearest neighbors (KNN). KNN uses the 
majority class of the K nearest observations to classify new observations (James et al., 
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to five. A small leaf size slows query times, while a larger leaf size turns the algorithm 
into a brute force attempt. For this research several leaf sizes and neighbor combinations 
were tested, with 30 providing the optimal result. Once again, to begin the training, all 
features were used in the exact same manner as outlined in the Random Forest and Naïve 
Bayes training sections. The results of all the features was a promising F! score of .903. 
In an attempt to improve this score and reduce the number of features used, features were 
added and removed over several training iterations (see Table 20 and Figure 12 below). 
The winning combination was the use of nine features: id.orig_p, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, 
proto, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_pkts, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes (all except 
duration, conn_state, history, resp_pkts). This produced a much improved F! score of 
.944. 
Table 20 
Features used for K-Nearest Neighbors training and their resulting scores 
 
Set Features Precision Recall 𝐅𝟏 
1 All except duration, conn_state, 
history, resp_pkts 
0.95721548 0.93073316 0.94356571 
2 All except resp_pkts, duration 0.91900245 0.95934569 0.9382125 
3 All except duration, history, 
resp_pkts 
0.91900245 0.95934569 0.9382125 
4 All except resp_pkts, duration, 
resp_ip_bytes 
0.89887964 0.92961424 0.9136548 
5 All except resp_pkts 0.9167699 0.90068201 0.90856184 
6 All 0.91491004 0.89087809 0.90252259 
7 orig_bytes, resp_bytes, 
orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes 
0.90217997 0.8711104 0.88599791 
8 id.orig_p, orig_bytes 0.87112676 0.89972293 0.88487307 
9 id.orig_p, orig_bytes, 
resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes, 
resp_ip_bytes 
0.87112676 0.89972293 0.88487307 
10 id.orig_p, orig_ip_byes, 
resp_ip_bytes 




11 id.orig_p, orig_pkts, resp_pkts, 
resp_ip_bytes  





Figure 12. The Naïve Bayes classifier trained on all device network traffic 
 
Best Classifier and Features 
 Overall, all three classifiers, K-Nearest Neighbors, Naïve Bayes, and Random 
Forest performed almost equally well with F! scores of .944, .942, and .945 respectively 
(see Table 21, Figure 13, and Figure 14 below). The main difference was the precision 
versus recall scores, plus the number of classifiers required to train the classifiers. The 
most balanced scores were achieved by K-Nearest Neighbors with a precision score of 
.957 and a recall score of .931. If it is important to have very few false positives then the 
Random Forest classifier, with a precision of .998, would be the best choice. However, 
this would result in failing to identify about 10% of the state changes since the recall for 
Random Forest is .902. Alternatively, if the goal is to identify almost all of the state 
changes, then Naïve Bayes is the best classifier to choose since it had a recall score of 
.998. This again comes with a downside: Naïve Bayes had a precision score of .898, 
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Scores comparisons of all three classifiers 
Classifier Precision Recall 𝐅𝟏 
KNN 0.95721548 0.93073316 0.94356571 
Naïve Bayes 0.8984375 0.99792199 0.94243709 










Figure 14. Each classifier and their correspond precision, recall, and F! scores 
 
 Random Forest was by far the best classifier in terms of requiring the fewest 
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22 below). Both K-Nearest Neighbors and Naïve Bayes required almost twice as many, 
needing nine and ten features respectively. Requiring fewer features lowers the overhead 
in future training and can simplify the implementation of the classifier.   
Table 22 
Number of features by category required per classifier 
Classifier Synthesized Protocol 
specific 
Aggregated Total # of 
Features 
Random Forest 0 3 2 5 
K-Nearest 
Neighbor 
0 6 3 9 
Naïve Bayes 2 6 2 10 
 
All three categories of features, synthesized, protocol specific, and aggregated, 
were used to optimally train the classifiers (see Table 22, above). However, synthesized 
features were only used by Naïve Bayes. The most heavily relied upon category of 
features for training was protocol specific, accounting for 15 out of the total of 24 
features used. 
Four features were required to optimally train all three of the classifiers: id.orig_p, 
orig_bytes, resp_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes (see Table 23, Figure 15, and Figure 16 
below). All of these features, except for id.orig_p, deal with the number of bytes sent in 
the connection. This indicates that the number of bytes sent is vital information for all 
three classifiers when identifying state changes. 
Table 23 
Features by category required per classifier 
Feature Category Random Forest K-Nearest Neighbor Naïve Bayes 













Protocol specific  orig_bytes orig_bytes orig_bytes 










Aggregated  orig_ip_bytes orig_ip_bytes orig_ip_bytes 
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Figure 16. The number of features used by each of the optimally trained classifiers per 
feature category 
  
 One important aspect to note is overhead issues. When training all three of the 
different machine learning algorithms, all three completed their runs within just a few 
seconds. Given that the dataset only contained hundreds of lines of data, as opposed to 
thousands of lines, a quick run was not surprising. Therefore, it was not possible to judge 
which algorithm could require more overhead due to a longer runtime. 
Summary 
 It is possible to identify state changes in encrypted traffic sent from an iPhone to a 
smart device’s Cloud site. Training a classifier to spot these change requests is highly 
successful when done per device. In other words, near perfect identification of turning a 
light switch from on to off from a mobile app can be achieved by identifying patterns in 
the encrypted traffic. 
It is also possible to train a classifier to identify all state changes hidden in 
encrypted network traffic across several types of smart home devices. Three different 
classifiers were tested: Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbors. All three 
had similar success varying only in their recall and precision scores. In this research 
experiment, there was success in identifying state changes sent from three different 
categories of smart home devices: those that have simple state changes, those that have 
more complex state changes, and those that send a lot of data when a state change is 




Garage Opener. The more complex device was the Rachio Smart Sprinkler system. The 










Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Conclusions 
Smart home device account takeover is trivial due to two of the top vulnerabilities 
of smart home devices: weak password policies and a lack of account lockout by the 
device’s Cloud server (Alharbi & Aspinall, 2018). Once an attacker has commandeered 
access to a smart home device, they could harass the resident, lock the user out of their 
device, scare the user out of their house (to gain access to rob it), and several other 
malicious attacks (Freed et al., 2018a; Ronen & Shamir, 2016a). Currently, there is not an 
easy way for home users to detect that a malicious actor is making unwanted changes to 
their smart home devices (Geeng & Roesner, 2019a; Matthews et al., 2017; Zeng et al., 
2017). Previous research has leveraged patterns discovered in encrypted network traffic 
to identify a smart home device and if it has received a state change request (Acar et al., 
2018; Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 2017a; Copos et al., 2016a; Marchal et al., 2019; 
Meidan et al., 2017; Miettinen et al., 2017a; V. Sivaraman et al., 2015). The research 
detailed in this paper successfully extended previous research by identifying state 
changes sent via network traffic between a smart device’s app running on a smartphone 
and the smart device’s Cloud site.  
This research also succeeded in identifying state change requests sent from a 




popular smart home devices: 1) devices with simple behaviors, 2) devices with complex 
behaviors, and 3) devices that send a lot of data. This included four smart home devices: 
the TP-Link smart plug and the myQ garage door opener representing device’s with 
simple behaviors, the Rachio smart sprinkler system, which is a device capable of more 
complex behaviors, and Amazon’s Ring video camera which sends a large amount of 
data. The network traffic patterns indicative of a state change were identified for each of 
the smart home devices and then used to label the captured network traffic. The Random 
Forest algorithm was successfully trained using this labeled network traffic data for all 
four of the devices individually. 
The main goal of this research was also achieved. This entailed identifying the 
best combination of network traffic features and machine learning algorithms capable of 
identifying state changes in encrypted traffic across all four of the devices. The most 
balanced results was achieved with the k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm, the Random 
Forest algorithm had the highest precision score, and Naïve Bayes had the best recall 
score. The most efficient algorithm was determined to be Random Forest and the most 
important features were id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes since they 
were used to optimally train each of the three algorithms. 
Implications 
The purpose of this research was to identify rogue changes made to a smart home 
device by an actor who is outside the home network. This addresses the situation when a 
user is at home and does not want state changes to be made to their same home devices 
by an individual outside the home. Identifying these rogue changes is possible due to the 




directly controlled by the smart home device’s Cloud server (Apthorpe, Reisman, & 
Feamster, 2017a). Therefore, the Cloud server is usually the middleman between the 
smart device’s app running on a smartphone and the smart home device. When a user 
requests a change on their smartphone via the smart device’s app, the change request is 
sent to the smart device’s Cloud server, the change is noted on the Cloud server, and then 
sent to the smart home device.  
When a user initiates a state change request at home, the change request originates 
from inside the home across the home WiFi network, travels outside the home to the 
Cloud server, then back in again. This is in contrast to when someone outside the home 
makes a change; the change is applied to the Cloud server, sent down to the home WiFi 
network, and applied to the smart device. What is missing when the change request 
originates from outside the home is the traversal of the state change request across the 
home WiFi network. This missing piece can be used to establish if the change originated 
from inside the home or from outside the home; if the state change is seen in the home 
WiFi traffic, then it originated from inside the home, if it is not seen, then the change 
originated from outside the home. 
This research, using machine learning algorithms, successfully identified state 
change requests sent from a smartphone, across the home WiFi network, to the smart 
device’s Cloud site. This was accomplished for three main types of smart home devices: 
those are capable of simple behaviors, those with more complex behaviors, and those that 
send a lot of data. 
A limitation of this research was that the Zeek was the main tool used to analyze 




explored in future research. Additionally, most of the identification tasks included in this 
research are binary. The implication is that if multiple categories are added, then the 
performance will more than likely degrade. 
Recommendations 
 This research extends previous work which explored the use of machine learning 
to identify state changes applied to smart home devices. This research can also be 
extended. Network traffic generated from other smart home device apps can be added to 
the traffic generated and labeled from this research. This would create a list of devices 
that could or could not have their state changes identified in encrypted traffic by machine 
learning algorithms. Further testing could be done by adding more smart home devices to 
each category of smart home devices and then testing the effectiveness of machine 
learning within each category or combinations between categories.  
Additionally, smart hubs and smart assistants could also be studied. As stated 
previously, both devices act similarly to smart phones in that they send state changes via 
encrypted traffic over a home WiFi network. Therefore, it is possible that using a similar 
approach taken in this research, state changes sent by smart hubs and smart assistants 
could be identified.  
 This research project used 13 different network traffic features, in various 
combinations to train machine learning algorithms. This omitted eight features that were 
identified by this research as potential candidates. These could be tested along with others 
that this research did not identify. It is possible that the features that were not tested prove 




This research did not cover an exhaustive combination of features tested with 
machine learning algorithms. Many more could be tested. Additionally, new features 
could be combined with new machine learning algorithms that were not identified in this 
research. Combinations of these could also be included in future research. 
 Once again, the purpose of this research was to identify and possibly prevent 
unwanted external state changes. Therefore, future research could build such a system 
that would be capable of doing just that: either alerting the home user of a rogue change 
or blocking the change from being applied to the smart home device. This would involve 
tying together this research with previous research that demonstrated the feasibility of 
identifying state changes sent from the Cloud site to the smart home device. The missing 
piece of the proposed system would need to be capable of linking state changes sent out 
to the Cloud site via a smartphone on the home WiFi network to those that were coming 
in from the Cloud site to the smart home device. Preventing the state change from taking 
place has previously been studied in the form of intrusion prevention systems that are 
capable of dropping unwanted packets. 
Summary   
 Smart home devices are becoming more popular with consumers with the number 
of devices in peoples’ homes increasing (He et al., 2018). Malicious users have taken 
notice of this trend and have begun to manipulate these devices through known 
vulnerabilities such as poor authentication practices (Freed et al., 2018a). One way to 
monitor these malicious changes is by monitoring home network traffic. 
Change requests to smart home devices travel across the network in the form of 




simply read the contents of the packet to learn if the packet contains instructions for the 
smart device to change states (Apthorpe, Reisman, Sundaresan, et al., 2017; Copos et al., 
2016a). However, there are attributes of the packet that are not that are not encrypted, 
which, along with the size of the payload can be used to establish patterns indicative of a 
smart device state change request, versus an update, versus a status check (Meidan et al., 
2017). This research has extended previous research by identifying the best combination 
of features and machine learning algorithms combination capable of identifying state 
change requests across a variety of different types of popular smart home devices. This 
was accomplished in three major phases: phase 1) focused on analyzing the publicly 
available network data captures, phase 2) involved capturing the network traffic and 
identifying the traffic patterns indicative of a state change request of several smart home 
devices, and phase 3) included identifying network traffic features, using those features to 
train machine learning algorithms, and identify the machine learning algorithm that 
performed the best across all of the selected smart home devices. 
Phase one involved the datasets provided by Alrawi et al. (2019) and Ren et al. 
(2019). Alrawi et al. (2019) collected network traffic over a period of 13 days resulting in 
over 150 GB of data. The analysis of this dataset found that there was not one instance 
when both the smart device’s app and the smart device were sending or receiving 
network traffic within the same timeframe (i.e. within five minutes of each other). The 
second dataset from Ren et al. (2019), included network traffic captured from 81 different 
smart home devices located in labs located in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In-depth analysis of both datasets was performed. Unfortunately, it was discovered that 




 Phase two involved capturing network traffic in a lab environment and then 
identifying the state changes of four smart home devices from three different categories 
of devices: 1) simple behavior, where the TP-Link WiFi Plug and the Chamberlain myQ 
Garage Opener were selected, 2) complex behavior, which included the Rachio Smart 
Sprinkler, and 3) sending large amounts of data, in which the Amazon’s Ring video 
camera was selected. The TP-Link’s state change was identified by a new connection that 
would be created between the iPhone and the TP-Link WiFi Plug directly whenever the 
switch was turned on or off. Additionally, identical values for three network attributes 
were seen every time the plug’s state was changed. For the myQ device, a pattern 
emerged in which the app on the iPhone would communicate with the account-devices-
gdo.myq-cloud.com Cloud site whenever the door was either opened or closed. Next, the 
Ring device’s state change was identified by SIP traffic that was seen every time the 
camera was put into Live mode. Finally, the Rachio “quick run” state change was 
identified by the connection to the Cloud site rach.io.  
 The training of the machine learning algorithms involved selected features from 
three categories: 1) aggregated, 2) synthesized, and 3) protocol specific. This included 13 
features across the three categories. The first step involved using the Random Forest 
algorithm to identify state changes of each of the devices. The TP-Link plug was 
successfully trained with the just three features: resp_bytes, original_bytes, and 
orig_ip_bytes. Perfect scores for cross validation across all folds was achieved, with 
perfect scores for the root mean square score across all folds, and for the precision, recall, 
and F! scores. Only three features was necessary to optimally train the myQ device: 




Again, only three features were needed to successfully train the Ring device: id.resp_p, 
orig_ip_bytes, and resp_ip_bytes. The precision, recall, and F! scores were all 100%. 
Finally, the Rachio device also required three features to optimally train it: orig_pkts, 
resp_ip_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes. The precision, recall, and F! scores were, once again, 
all 100%. 
 The culminating task was to combine all of the network traffic from all four of the 
devices and then train three different machine learning algorithms with different 
combinations of features. The three different algorithms were Random Forest, Naïve 
Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbors. Starting with the Random Forest algorithm, the best 
results were obtained with five features: resp_bytes, orig_ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes, 
orig_bytes, and id.orig_p. This produced a precision score of 99.9002%, recall of 93.902 
%, and an F! score of 96.7033%. The Naïve Bayes algorithm performed similarity, with a 
precision score of 99.9002%, recall of 93.902 % and an F! score of 96.7033%. Finally 
the K-Nearest Neighbors algorithm produced the best results when trained with ten 
features: id.orig_p, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, proto, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, orig_pkts, 
ip_bytes, resp_ip_bytes (all except duration, conn_state, history, resp_pkts). This 
produced an impressive F! score of .9435. 
Overall, all three classifiers, K-Nearest Neighbors, Naïve Bayes, and Random 
Forest performed almost equally well with F! scores of .94356, .9423, and .9449 
respectively. They varied in their precision and recall scores, plus the number of 
classifiers required for training. K-Nearest Neighbors achieved the most balanced results 
with a precision score of .9572 and a recall score of .9307. The Random Forest algorithm 




.9979. In terms of number of features required to train an algorithm, Random Forest was 
by far the best requiring just five features. Finally, it was evident that the most important 
features, which were used for all three classifiers, came down to just four features: 
id.orig_p, orig_bytes, resp_bytes, and orig_ip_bytes. 
In summary, our research goal – the identification of state changes by using 
encrypted IoT network traffic – was achieved empirically. The success of identifying 
state change requests sent from a mobile app, combined with previous research that 
identified state changes sent to the smart home device, allows for the development of a 
system that could block unwanted state changes that originate from a malicious user 
located outside of the house. Therefore, this research adds to the body of knowledge to 
IoT security and could be extended to the identification of other networking patterns 







Zeek’s conn.log fields 
 
Zeek’s possible conn_state values 
Value Description 
S0  Connection attempt seen, no reply. 
Field Description 
ts This is the time of the first packet. 
uid A unique identifier of the connection. 
id.orig_h The originator's 4-tuple of endpoint address. 
id.orig_p The originator's 4-tuple of endpoint port. 
id.resp_h The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint address. 
id.resp_p The responder's 4-tuple of endpoint port. 
proto The transport layer protocol of the connection. 
service An identification of an application protocol being sent over the connection. 
duration 
How long the connection lasted. For 3-way or 4-way connection tear-downs, this will 
not include the final ACK. 
orig_bytes The number of payload bytes the originator sent. 
resp_bytes The number of payload bytes the responder sent. See orig_bytes. 
conn_state There are several possible conn_state values (see table  below). 
local_orig 
If the connection is originated locally, this value will be T. If it was originated 
remotely it will be F. 
local_resp 
If the connection is responded to locally, this value will be T. If it was responded to 
remotely it will be F.  
missed_bytes 
Indicates the number of bytes missed in content gaps, which is representative of packet 
loss.  
history Records the state history of connections as a string of letters (see table below). 
orig_pkts Number of packets that the originator sent 
orig_ip_bytes 
Number of IP level bytes that the originator sent (as seen on the wire, taken from the IP 
total_length header field). 
resp_pkts Number of packets that the responder sent. 
resp_ip_bytes 
Number of IP level bytes that the responder sent (as seen on the wire, taken from the IP 
total_length header field). 
conn_state 




S1  Connection established, not terminated. 
SF  Normal establishment and termination. 
REJ  Connection attempt rejected. 
S2  Connection established and close attempt by originator seen (but no reply from responder). 
S3  Connection established and close attempt by responder seen (but no reply from originator). 
RSTO  Connection established, originator aborted (sent a RST). 
RSTR  Responder sent a RST. 
RSTOS0  Originator sent a SYN followed by a RST, we never saw a SYN-ACK from the responder. 
RSTRH 
 Responder sent a SYN ACK followed by a RST, we never saw a SYN from the (purported) 
originator. 
SH 
 Originator sent a SYN followed by a FIN, we never saw a SYN ACK from the responder 
(hence the connection was “half” open). 
SHR  Responder sent a SYN ACK followed by a FIN, we never saw a SYN from the originator. 
OTH  No SYN seen, just midstream traffic (a “partial connection” that was not later closed). 
 
Zeek’s conn.log history field 
Letter Meaning 
s a SYN w/o the ACK bit set 
h a SYN+ACK (“handshake”) 
a a pure ACK 
d packet with payload (“data”) 
f packet with FIN bit set 
r packet with RST bit set 
c packet with a bad checksum (applies to UDP too) 
g a content gap 
t packet with retransmitted payload 
w packet with a zero window advertisement 
i inconsistent packet (e.g. FIN+RST bits set) 





^ connection direction was flipped by Zeek’s heuristic 
Note: If the event comes from the originator, the letter is in upper-case 
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